Profiling the Operational Codes of Political Leadersonly for a particular issue toward a specific target and (b) to detect
learning effects on the leader's beliefs over time. As the following
example reveals, this effort may or may not significantly refine the
predictions.
In a study of President Jimmy Carter's operational code (Walker,
Schafer, and Young 1998), the results indicate that the elements of
Carter's belief system remained relatively stable over time for much
of his administration. No statistically significant changes in the
VICS indices occurred for his general operational code until after the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (see table 9.2). Even then, the key
VICS indices that locate Carter in the type C quadrant (I-i and 1-2)
did not change enough to move him unequivocably to a different
quadrant; however, the key indices that summarize the nature of the
political universe (P-i and P-2) did clearly move from type A in the
direction of the type DBF quadrant.
The effect of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Carter's opera-
tional code toward the Soviet Union was more dramatic, shifting
Carter's beliefs about Soviet-American relations into different quad-
rants of the operational code template. Shifts in the key VICS indices
for Carter's diagnostic propensities from cooperation to conflict plus
a change in the balance of control over historical development relo-
cated Soviet-American relations. The data in table 9.3 show that
Carter's view of the Soviet Union shifted from an extremely friendly
orientation to a somewhat hostile orientation. This shift was accom-
panied by a decrease in the cooperation of his strategic and tactical
choice propensities toward the USSR and a strong increase in his
propensities to shift between conflict and cooperation and between
words and deeds.
How Do You Predict Behavioral Differences between Leaders?
A comparison of the VICS indices for two different leaders can reveal
points of agreement and disagreement about the nature of the polit-
ical universe and the most effective moves, tactics, and strategies for
realizing political goals. Such comparisons can reveal what the possi-
ble effects of a change in leaders within or between states might be.
To illustrate these possibilities, let us consider the results of a com-
parative study of two Israeli leaders, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon
Peres, during two different decades, 1974-77 and 1992—95