The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaderscleansing," the execution of hundreds of political prisoners to make
room for new ones in Iraq's crowded prisons. He is also the one who
authorizes executions of military and security officers suspected of
disloyalty. Starting in 2000, Qusay started receiving a great deal of
coverage by the Baath party and is now referred to as "Warrior
Qusay." Supplanting Uday in the succession, he has been named
Saddam's deputy "in the event of an emergency." Since 2001, Qusay
has also been a member of the Regional Leadership (RL) of the Baath
party in Iraq and deputy secretary of its important: Military Bureau
(al-Maktab al-'Askari).^4 The promotion of Qusay to the RL is seen as
the first step toward his inclusion in the Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC) and, eventually, his promotion to the RCC chair-
manship and presidency.
Strategic Shift. The family disarray culminating in the Hussein
Kamal defection and assassination, and the decline of Uday and his
replacement as director of security forces by Qusay, signaled a major
change of strategy. No longer could the loyalty of Saddam's family
be unquestioningly relied upon. Rather it was necessary for Saddam
to strengthen the Baath party and rely more centrally on long-stand-
ing party loyalists.
Redemption and Restoration of Morale Courtesy of the Kurds
In late August 1996, Saddam Hussein authorized elements of the
Republican Guard to attack the Kurdish city of Irbil following the
securing of military assistance from Iran by the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK). The guard "smashed" the PUK and the U.S.-
backed INC. The seizure of Irbil was a major success for Saddam.
This triumph after a series of setbacks and reminders of their dimin-
ished status restored the morale of the Republican Guard (and their
faith in Saddam). It demonstrated that the regime was still very
much in control and was a major power throughout the country. It
also showed the fractionalization and impotence of the opposition
movements in Iraq and was a powerful demonstration of the risk of
rising against Saddam. This was a major turning point for the
regime in terms of restoring its power position—had the guard not
taken Irbil, it is likely that Saddam's support would have been so
undermined that his position would have been in grave jeopardy.