The Psychological Assessment of Political Leadersdogmatic; he is doing what is right. He may, though, be merely pos-
turing, proposing the "tough" bargaining position as his opening
move, and testing the opposition. If the opposition does not counter,
Hussein has proven his point; if they do counter, the bargaining has
begun. In the course of the bargaining, the subtleties in Hussein's
thinking and a certain pragmatism will become evident. To be most
effective, given Hussein's Machiavellian impulses, any negotiations
with him should be face-to-face or through highly trusted interme-
diaries. He is less likely to misinterpret or misconstrue toward his
own ends what is possible in such settings than when the negotia-
tions occur at a distance.
The data in table 17.2 suggest that Hussein is sensitive to issues
and problems; three of the seven (43 percent) traits evidenced statis-
tically significant differences by the topic under discussion. Given
his proclivity to see the world as full of threats that must be dealt
with, it is easier to understand his focus on problems. To maintain
power and influence, he has to meet such threats head on and, thus,
must be constantly vigilant. But this responsiveness implies that one
way to know what Hussein is thinking about a problem is to code his
discussions of that issue in speeches and interviews.
One of the traits that differed significantly by topic was national-
ism. Although all the means for nationalism by topic were high
when compared to Middle Eastern leaders and eighty-seven heads of
state, Hussein clearly tempered and increased his emphasis on
nationalism depending on the target. Although still high, his
nationalism in discussions of relations with Arabic and non-Arabic
countries is more focused on the positive qualities of Iraq and the
payoffs of relationships with Iraq for the other government and state;
it is more tempered and is "courting" in tone—whereas when he per-
ceives trouble, his nationalism increases and his focus is on contrast-
ing how good Iraq is with how bad the particular opposition is.
Indeed, he tends to "rail" against those who are causing him trouble.
In such cases, there are definite enemies, and they are in the wrong.
His nationalism scores are above his own mean score for areas that are
threatening to him and below his mean score when he perceives there
is an opportunity to move ahead on his goals. This difference in
scores may signal a potential indicator of what he perceives as threats