Saddam Hussein's Leadership Styleand what he perceives as opportunities. Note that of the six topics,
two-thirds are threats, which is likely to be the balance in any exam-
ination of his rhetoric, given his generally high nationalism.
Another of Hussein's traits that showed statistically significant
differences across topics was the need for power. The literature on
this motive suggests that individuals display this need when they are
in situations where they, indeed, do seek power and believe they do
not currently have it. Hussein's scores across topics tend to reflect
this more general finding. He evidences less need for power in his
discussions of domestic politics and the Gulf War. Both these need
for power scores are low in comparison to Middle Eastern leaders and
the eighty-seven heads of state. Hussein had and was wielding power
in both these contexts. Where he sought more power and influence
was in his responses to interviewers' queries about relations with
other Arab as well as non-Arab states and in his responses regarding
the Iran-Iraq War. All three of the need for power scores are high
when related to the comparison groups of leaders. Here is where
Hussein's Machiavellianism will be at its most pronounced. He is
likely to attempt all sorts of tactics to gain more influence. He will
be charming if such behavior seems likely to succeed; he will be a
bully if such a strategy has a chance of working. In each case, Hus-
sein will test the limits to see how far he can go before he starts to
lose rather than maintain or win more power. The differences in the
need for power scores suggest how ruthless Hussein is prepared to be
and how much risk he is likely to take to gain what he wants. To
some extent, the topics where the scores are highest also indicate the
arenas over which Hussein seeks more control.
The last characteristic where there were significant differences
across topics was distrust of others. Hussein's scores on distrust of
others suggest whom he blames for his situation and the ills of Iraq.
His scores for responses regarding the Kurds, the Iran-Iraq War, and
the Gulf War are all high in comparison to the Middle Eastern lead-
ers and the group of eighty-seven heads of state. Others are to blame
for what is happening, for stirring up trouble, for making it hard for
him to succeed. Because Hussein himself is responsible for domestic
policy-making, he can remove those who he perceives do him ill. He
can control what happens. Thus, note that the distrust of others score