The Economist March 26th 2022 53
China
Chinesepolitics
Xi’s stormy year
N
o date hasbeen set for it yet, not even
a month. But for every official, the or
ders are clear. Their work must focus on
making sure that a crucial Communist Par
ty congress, to be held in the second half of
the year, goes smoothly. The conclave is
widely expected to herald the start of at
least another five years of rule for Xi Jin
ping. From the police to economic policy
makers, all are trying to minimise unto
ward events that might overshadow his
moment of political glory. “The word ‘sta
bility’ is the key,” leaders intone about the
coming year at official gatherings.
It will be a far bumpier ride than they
would like. In recent weeks the rapid
spread of Omicron, a highly transmissible
variant of the virus that causes covid19,
has posed an unprecedented challenge to
China’s muchvaunted “zerocovid” policy.
Widespread lockdowns have added to the
wobbles of an already shaky economy. Just
this month Mr Xi contrasted the party’s
rule with “Western chaos”. He was refer
ring, in part, to China’s two years of success
(after a botched initial response) at crush
ing covid. If officials relax the policy to
protect the economy they would risk a
surge of cases that could overwhelm Chi
na’s fragile publichealth system.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is another
severe headache. The war began less than
three weeks after Mr Xi and his Russian
counterpart, Vladimir Putin, signed a joint
statement in February declaring “no lim
its” to the two countries’ friendship. Chi
nese diplomats are now struggling to bal
ance a desire to preserve what they see as
this crucial relationship against a risk of
even greater tension between China and
the West, which could compound China’s
economic difficulties.
Public opinion is hard to gauge, but
there is little sign that the party’s policies
on covid, Ukraine or the economy are
widely resented. Many Chinese express
support for the tough zerocovid approach.
On social media, however, some grum
blingcirculates—despite censors’ efforts
to stifle it. Even in the statecontrolled
press there have been occasional hints of
disagreement over the party’s economic
strategy, which last year included a regula
tory clampdown on tech firms and a call by
Mr Xi for “common prosperity” that scared
entrepreneurs by raising the spectre of big
redistributive schemes. Intriguingly, the
prime minister, Li Keqiang, mentioned
common prosperity only once in his state
ofthenation speech to the national legis
lature on March 5th.
Among Chinawatchers, there is much
speculation about the extent of opposition
to Mr Xi within the elite, and the impact it
might have on his political grip. But there
is no convincing evidence that his plans
could be derailed for the party congress
and a meeting immediately afterwards of
the Central Committee, which will an
nounce the leadership lineup (including
his own likely appointment to a third term
as party chief, violating recent norms). In
deed, history suggests that for all the par
ty’s preoccupation with stability in the
buildup to party congresses, which nor
mally are held every five years, the power
of paramount leaders can survive enor
mous buffeting.
Mao Zedong, for example, ruled China
for nearly 27 years, despite the deaths of
In a crucial political year, Xi Jinping wants stability. He won’t get it
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