56 China The Economist March 26th 2022
Winningthenarrative war
A
month afterVladimir Putin plunged Europe into war, China
is ready to explain why it sees no urgent need to stop Russia—
its closest strategic partner—from killing Ukrainians. After fine
tuning arguments and propaganda lines for weeks, China’s Com
munist Party bosses and their envoys now have talking points for
every audience.
The most common argument is built on deflection and anti
Americanism. This is used for Chinese domestic consumption
and in public contacts with Western governments. As Chinese of
ficials tell it, Russia is defending itself against American aggres
sion and a long campaign of encirclement by nato. Chinese offi
cials think it is unfair of Western leaders to ask their government
to intervene, because only American concessions to Mr Putin can
bring lasting peace. Moreover, if the war is going slowly, that is be
cause American interests profit from drawnout agonies, Chinese
diplomats charge. Spelling out the accusation, a deputy foreign
minister, Le Yucheng, told a gathering at Tsinghua University that
“arms dealers, bankers and oil tycoons” from a certain big country
(ie, America) are making “highly immoral” fortunes out of the war,
while Ukraine suffers. This hard line comes from the top. China’s
supreme leader, Xi Jinping, has given instructions that Russia is to
be defended and America held responsible for Ukraine’s woes,
leaving underlings to “backfill a foreign policy” around that deci
sion, a foreign diplomat based in Beijing explains. To dramatise
America’s obligations, Mr Xi reached for a Songdynasty saying
during a twohour video call with President Joe Biden on March
18th, declaring: “He who tied the bell to the tiger must take it off.”
Mr Xi’s scolding, literary tone is striking because, according to
American briefings given to foreign ambassadors in Beijing, Mr
Biden used the call to convey his concerns that Russia may be con
templating attacks with chemical or biological weapons in Uk
raine. His warnings were not a surprise to the Chinese. A few days
earlier Mr Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, shared
American intelligence about Russia’s possible intentions with
China’s foreignpolicy chief, Yang Jiechi, during a sevenhour
meeting in Rome. Mr Sullivan told Mr Yang that Chinese support
for Russian aggression would have a lingering impact on bilateral
ties and on Mr Xi’s legacy. Mr Yang, it is related, responded with
anger and complaints about America’s support for Taiwan, the
democratic island that China claims as its own. Other officials
have since copied that same rhetorical pivot to Asia. Mr Le called
the crisis in Ukraine and natoenlargement a mirror for observing
American alliancebuilding in Asia and the Pacific, a trend which
if unchecked would push the region “into a pit of fire.”
To Europeans, it might seem a bit parochial for China to draw
parallels between a war under way in Ukraine and longstanding
Chinese resentments of American alliances in Asia. But seen from
Asia, there is a logic to China’s framing of the war in Ukraine as the
latest example of global disorder provoked by the West, with a spe
cial emphasis on the sanctions being imposed on Russia. In their
video call Mr Xi told Mr Biden that intensifying sanctions may
gravely disrupt food and energy markets and global supply chains.
After meeting African and Asian foreign ministers, China’s for
eign minister, Wang Yi, spoke of a common disquiet among devel
oping nations at being asked to take “black or white” moral posi
tions on complex international questions.
Such ultrapragmatic talking points, crafted to woo countries
from the global South, reflect a Chinese horror of being isolated.
But they also resonate with many governments, says a foreign dip
lomat in Beijing, describing meetings at which ambassadors from
nonaligned countries swallow Chinese arguments “like candy”.
China has a keen sense of countries with longstanding grievances
about the West, or that have been placed under sanctions them
selves for rights abuses, notes the diplomat. Against that, some
SouthEast Asian governments, from Singapore to Cambodia,
have voiced concerns about the dangerous precedent set by Rus
sia’s attack. China’s growling about alliances cuts both ways, says
a second diplomat. “China is worried about an Asian nato. The
only player that could make it happen, guaranteed, is China. Just
invade a neighbour and see what happens,” he suggests.
Guarding each other’s backs, against the West
A final talking point is offered more discreetly by Chinese officials
and scholars. This coldly realist argument asserts that China’s in
terests are simply not served by breaking with Russia. Zhou Bo, a
retired senior colonel in the People’s Liberation Army, now at the
Centre for International Security and Strategy and its China Forum
at Tsinghua University, insists that China is taking a balanced ap
proach to the war. But he predicts that if China were to condemn
Russia’s actions, Western governments would pocket the conces
sion and call it China merely doing the right thing. There is little
chance that broader, longterm American pressure on China will
ease, because China is not about to change its political system,
adds Mr Zhou. As a result, “If China ditches Russia, it is only a mat
ter of time before America comes after China once more.”
Wu Xinbo, dean of the internationalstudies institute at Fudan
University, calls it natural that in his conversation with Mr Biden,
Mr Xi stressed Chinese concerns about American support for Tai
wan. “Russia may worry about Ukraine joining nato, but Ukraine
is an independent sovereign country. Taiwan is part of China. So
in this sense, the Taiwan issue is far more important to China than
Ukraine is to Russia,” he says.
Western governments are frustrated that China calls itself a
peaceloving giant but will not condemn Mr Putin. That is to mis
read China, a country at once certain that its rise is unstoppable,
and sure that America is bent on stopping it. China has ambitions
to bestride the world one day. But it remains exceptionallyselfab
sorbed. Suffering in faraway Ukraine will not change that.n
Chaguan
China has honed its justifications for taking Russia’s side