The Economist April 2nd 2022 Asia 49bletogethomeevenmoreurgent.With
greatdifficulty,MrKoklovmanagedtobuy
a planetickettoRussiabutworriesitwill
becancelled.Thosewhoprefernottore
turntoRussiafacehardchoices.MsBebe
kinahopesto liveabroad.Shedoesnot
thinkshewillpickupmuchworkinRus
sia,given theeconomic turmoil,andis
scaredtheauthoritieswillpunishherfor
socialmediapostscriticisingtheregime.
Butshefindstheprospectofmakinga new
lifeoutsideRussiabothdaunting—finding
a jobabroadwillbehard—anddepressing.
Asa writer,“mylifeisconnectedwiththe
Russianlanguage.”Shespeaksformanyof
hercompatriotswhenshesays,“Iamnot
happythatI needtoconsiderotherwaysto
livemyfuture.”n
TheSolomonIslands
Getting closer
T
o thealarmofAustraliaandNewZea
land, the Solomon Islands has reached
a security agreement with China. The
prime minister, Manasseh Sogavare, con
firmed this on March 29th, furious that a
draft of the agreement had been leaked a
few days earlier. It envisaged the arrival of
Chinese military personnel and police and
occasional “ship visits” in order “to protect
the safety of Chinese personnel and major
projects in Solomon Islands”. Already, Chi
na has started training the local force in
riot control and handling replica weapons,
after years when Australia and New Zea
land have taken primary responsibility for
dealing with unrest in the Solomon Islands
and for reforming the police force.
The Solomons switched diplomatic rec
ognition from Taiwan to China in 2019.
Since then China has begun repairing the
country’s only gold mine and taken over
Taiwan’s financing of controversial “con
stituency development funds” for mps,
and the stateowned China Civil Engineer
ing Corporation has started building a sta
dium for the South Pacific Games next
year. China’s Pacific expansion does not of
fer commercial rewards as big as those
available in Africa or SouthEast Asia, but it
does bring important prizes in its long war
of diplomatic attrition with Taiwan. Kiri
bati, too, switched recognition to China in
2019, leaving only four Pacific countries
still aligned with Taiwan (Nauru, Tuvalu,
the Marshall Islands and Palau).
But China’s enhanced presence has met
stiff resistance from the provincial govern
ment on Malaita, the Solomons’ most pop
ulous island, whose provincialpremier,
DanielSuidani,isthemostvociferousop
ponentofChineseinfluence.MrSogavare
hastriedinvaintodislodgehim.Toback
MrSuidani,manyMalaitansinNovember
descended on the capital, Honiara, de
mandingthattheprimeministerhimself
stepdown.Theproteststriggeredserious
rioting,andthedestructionofmostofthe
Chinatown business district. Australia,
NewZealand,PapuaNewGuineaandFiji
deployedpeacekeepers.MrSogavarenow
sayshewantstodiversifyhissecuritypart
nersbyseekingassistancealsofromChi
na.HedeniesAustralianmediareportsofa
plannedChinesemilitarybase.
MrSogavare,whohashadfourstintsas
primeminister(allofwhichhaveended
prematurely),haslonghadfrostyrelations
withAustralia.Hissecondtermfollowed
seriousriotinginApril2006,duringthe14
yearlong Australialed Regional Assis
tance Mission to the Solomon Islands
(ramsi), whichalsoinvolvedNewZealand.
Hedidhisutmosttoundermineramsi.He
expelledbothanAustralianhighcommis
sionerandanAustralianpolicechief,but
was himselfthen ousted ina noconfi
dencevoteinDecember2007.
Hisdownfallthenwaspartlya conse
quenceofhispoorrelationswithregional
allies. This time, however, Mr Sogavare
surviveda noconfidencevoteonlyinDe
cember,allegedlythankstoChinesemon
ey disbursed as largesse to progovern
mentmps.Anotherelectionloomsin2023,
butMrSogavarewantstoextendtheparlia
mentarytermtogivehimselfanextrayear.
Thatsuggestionhasprovedhugelyunpop
ularwithSolomonIslanders.
AustraliaandNewZealandcandolittle
to meddledirectlyintheSolomons’do
mesticaffairs,butbothwieldconsiderable
influence.Covid19struckatlastinJanu
ary,wreakinghavoc,particularlyinHonia
ra,increasingthecountry’sdependenceon
traditional aid partners to prop up the
city’s dilapidated“Number 9” hospital.
AndmanySolomonIslandersarehorrifiedby pictures inthe localpress ofbaton
wieldingChineseriotpolicehoningtheir
skillsinquellingprotests.
The new security arrangement with
Chinabearssomeresemblancetotheones
withAustraliaandNewZealandcovering
policeassistance.Abigdifferencestems
fromChinesesettlers’bigpresenceinHo
niara.Theyownmanyofthecity’ssmallre
tailoutlets,benefitfromshadydealswith
thecashstrappedethnicMelanesiangov
ernmentandwerethemaintargetsofriot
ersinboth 2006 and2021.Themainjobfor
the nextgeneration of wouldbe peace
keepers may be protectingChinese set
tlers—orevenexercisingtheirpolicingtal
entsonsomeofthoseruggedmigrantson
thePacificfrontier.nWELLINGTON
China’s growing presence alarms
Australia and New Zealand
SydneyBrisbaneHoniaraMalaita
PortMoresbyAUSTRALIANEW
ZEALANDSOLOMON
ISLANDSVANUATUNew
Caledonia
(France)PAPUA
NEW GUINEAPACIFIC OCEAN750 kmIndonesiaOut of the
frying pan
I
n mid-marchIzawati Dewi, a mother of
one, began queuing at 4am at her local
shop to buy cooking oil. By the time it
opened, the line snaked 2km through her
town in central Java. She was lucky enough
to secure a pack. The shortage was nation
wide. In East Kalimantan, on Borneo,
which produces nearly twofifths of Indo
nesia’s palm oil, at least two homemakers
have died this month while queuing.
In February Indonesia’s government
capped the retail price of cooking oil (made
from palm oil) at 14,000 rupiah ($1) a litre
for the highestquality oil, and 11,500 rupi
ah for the cheaper sort. Overnight, shelves
emptied across the country of 273m peo
ple. For most Indonesians, imported oil is
an unaffordable luxury. On March 16th the
price cap was lifted and stocks miraculous
ly reappeared. But in the process, prices
have more than tripled.
Yeka Hendra Fatika, of the government
ombudsman, which monitors cookingoil
prices throughout 274 markets in Indone
sia, blames the price rise on factors includ
ing the war in Ukraine and the pandemic.
By February, the price of crude palm oil
(cpo)had spiked by 40% year on year. Hop
ing to curb the retail price of an important
commodity, the government in January
imposed a 20% “domestic market obliga
tion” (dmo) for all producers—ie, the share
of output they must offer on the local mar
ket before exporting. In early March this
was raised to 30%. Then, after suppliers re
sisted fiercely, the government a week later
did away with the dmo, in favour of charg
ing higher export levies on cpo.S INGAPORE
A palm-oil crisis in the world’s
biggest producer