48 Asia The Economist April 9th 2022
TheKoreanpeninsula
Bursting into
Hwasong
A
t aceremonyonApril1stSuhWook,
SouthKorea’sdefenceminister,boast
edthatSouthKoreacould“accuratelyand
swiftlystrikeanytargetsinNorthKorea”.
KimYoJong,a highrankingNorthKorean
officialandthesisterofKimJongUn,the
country’sdictator,quicklyfiredback,ac
cusingthe“scumlikeguy”of“senseless
bluster” for threatening a “preemptive
strike”.ShelateraddedthattheSouthKore
anarmywould“facea miserablefatelittle
shortoftotaldestructionandruin”ifit
weretoattack.
The colourful exchange comes at a time
of rising tensions. For over four years the
North has refrained from testing nuclear
weapons or the intercontinental ballistic
missiles (icbms) needed to deliver them to
America’s shores, supposedly because the
weapons’ development had been complet
ed. Now both programmes appear to be
coming out of hibernation.
In late February and early March North
Korea conducted two big rocket launches
which it claimed were to test reconnais
sance satellite equipment. American
spooks suspected those launches were lay
ing the groundwork for future weapons
tests. Then on March 24th something went
up that both sides agreed was an icbm.
North Korea said it was a Hwasong17, a
previously untested missile larger than
anything in its arsenal. It backed up this
claim with footage of the launch, which
paid homage to 1980s action movies. In it a
leatherjacketed Mr Kim taps his watch,
dramatically tears his sunglasses from his
face and nods gravely, as if signalling the
start of the action. The launch itself is
filmed from several angles.
America and South Korea said the video
was doctored. The launch, they said, was
probably of the smaller Hwasong15, which
has already been tested. That is plausible.
North Korea has faked missiletest footage
before. Colin Zwirko, an analyst at nk
News, a Seoulbased outlet, thinks the re
gime may have been trying to make up for a
launch that failed on March 16th. Which
ever missile it was, North Korea’s selfim
posed moratorium on icbmtesting is over.
More worrying still is the prospect that
nuclear tests will soon follow. Satellite im
agery shows new activity around one of the
tunnels at Punggyeri, North Korea’s only
known nucleartesting facility, which Mr
Kim shut down in 2018. Analysts believe
that testing could resume by midApril.
That wouldcoincide nicely with the
110th anniversary, on April 15th, of the birth
of Kim Il Sung: Mr Kim’s grandfather and
the founder of North Korea’s hereditary
dictatorship. A large military parade is
planned. Mr Kim likes to celebrate big oc
casions with a bang. Every nuclear test
conducted during his reign has fallen
within a week of his birthday, his father’s
birthday or the anniversary of the coun
try’s founding.
Domestic worries may be one reason
for the renewed activity. Everyday life for
ordinary North Koreans has become nota
bly grimmer since the start of the pandem
ic. Mr Kim sealed the country’s borders,
causing severe food shortages and batter
ing the informal markets that provide ma
ny locals with a living. Mr Kim might be
hoping that tests and martial pageantry
will bring a little cheer. If indeed the re
gime did doctor the footage of the latest
launch, the intended audience may well
have been viewers at home.
But Mr Kim doubtless also wants to im
prove his military capabilities and thus his
leverage in negotiations with adversaries,
with the eventual goal of being accepted as
a nuclear power. Though he has already
shown that he can send icbms skyward, he
has yet to prove that the missiles can deliv
er a payload to their targets. He may also be
trying to develop lowyield nuclear weap
ons. Such devices could sit on shorter
ranged missiles aimed at the South, and
help further Mr Kim’s ambition to fire mul
tiple warheads from a single icbm.
Mr Suh’s term ends in May, along with
that of his boss Moon Jaein, South Korea’s
current president, who tried to win over Mr
Kim. The incoming president, Yoon Suk
yeol, takes a harder line. He repeatedly en
dorsed the idea of preemptive strikes on
the campaign trail. The noise on theKore
an peninsula—both from missiles and
rhetoric—is about to get much louder. n
S EOUL
North Korea is testing missiles again.
Nuclear weapons may be next
Highway to the danger zone
TheIndo-Pacific
AUKUS goes
hypersonic
S
ixmonthsagoAmericaandBritainsaid
they would help Australia acquire the
crown jewels of the defence world: nuc
learpowered submarines. The aukus
pact, announced on September 15th, re
flected Australia’s fear of China’s growing
power; America’s willingness to break old
taboos to counter it; and Britain’s eager
ness to bolster its role in Asia. The three
countries also promised to cooperate in
areas from cyber capabilities to quantum
technologies. Now these allies are turning
their attention to hypersonic missiles.
Such projectiles travel at sustained
speeds of Mach 5 while manoeuvring.
There are two sorts. Hypersonic cruise
missiles, like Russia’s Kinzhal, employed
in Ukraine on March 18th, are powered by
airbreathing engines. Hypersonic glide
vehicles, like Russia’s Avangard and Chi
na’s df17, go up on rockets, but glide down
over long distances.
China has “outpaced the United States
in graduating hypersonicspecialised en
gineers, publishing open scientific papers,
and constructing hypersonic wind tun
nels”, noted a report by csis, an American
thinktank, in February. The Pentagon car
ried out a successful hypersonic test in
midMarch (it was kept quiet to avoid rais
ing tensions with Russia) but several previ
ous ones failed. So it is not hard to see why
America wants to collaborate with allies.
America and Australia have been work
ing on an airlaunched hypersonic cruise
missile under the cheesy rubric of scifire
for 15 years, taking advantage of the Woom
era test range in southern Australia, one of
the world’s largest, and Australia’s seven
hypersonic wind tunnels. Britain is further
behind, but gave a $12m contract to Rolls
Royce, an aerospace company, to work on
suitable engines in 2019. The trio plan to
swap notes “to accelerate our pro
grammes”, says a British official.
This evolution of aukus shows that
Western allies see a pressing need to pool
their resources and talents to keep pace
with China. It might also futureproof the
pact. America and Britain have been shar
ing information on nuclear propulsion
technology with Australia since February;
that sort of thing is so sensitive that it will
stay within the club of three. But collabora
tion in other areas—which will now also
include electronic warfare—might allow
other Sinosceptic partners, like Indiaor
Japan, to plug into aukusin the future.n
A strategic submarine pact turns its
attention to a new breed of missiles