52 China The Economist April 9th 2022
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ach new Russian atrocity in Ukraine prompts a question
about China. Surely, foreign governments wonder, China’s
leader, Xi Jinping, must distance himself from Vladimir Putin
soon—if only to avoid harming his own national interests?
Alas, the history of outsiders telling leaders in Beijing how to
judge China’s interests is long, and littered with disappointment.
The Ukraine conflict is no exception. One reason for this involves
geopolitics, and an argument madeby Chinese officials and state
media, as well as in special classes being organised by universities
to give academics and students a “correct understanding” of the
war. This says thatMr Putin attacked Ukraine in selfdefence, after
America encroached on Russia by pushing European nations into
the natomilitary alliance. No matter that this turns history on its
head, and ignores the pleas of exSoviet satellite states to join na-
toas a defence against Russian aggression. To China, natoen
largement is a hostile act which calls to mind American alliance
building in Asia. That makes Russia an invaluable partner in a glo
bal contest against American bullying, which China can ill afford
to abandon. By this cold logic, Ukraine’s agonies are a distraction.
A second explanation for China’s embrace of Russia is harder to
see and hear, for it involves an indoctrination campaign within
the Communist Party. This draws lessons from the “tragedy” of the
Soviet Union’s disintegration. It takes its lead from Mr Xi, who
caststhe Soviet collapse as a crisis of lost communist faith. Several
timesduring his first decade as leader,Mr Xi has condemned Sovi
et party leaders and officials for becoming a selfserving caste and
for losing political control of the army. Above all, Mr Xi blames the
Soviet collapse on “historical nihilism”, jargon for allowing ideo
logical foes to dwell on dark episodes in history.
A new, 101minute Chinese documentary made for internal
party use, “Historical Nihilism and the Soviet Collapse, Reflec
tions on 30 years since the Disintegration of the Soviet Party and
Nation”, takes up that charge. Though not widely publicised, the
film has been studiedsince late last year. There are brief reports of
screenings all around China, in central and provincial govern
ment bodies but also at universities and law courts, municipal
party committees and at least one local forestry bureau: evidence
of a campaign ordered from the top. The film has not been releasedincinemas or on television, but may be found online.
The film lionises Stalin. It blames famines that followed his
collectivisation of agriculture on rich peasants hoarding grain. It
denies that his political purges killed millions, though it admits to
some excesses.The documentary calls it slander to accuse Adolf
Hitler and Stalin of jointly launching the second world war (Po
land, which the two tyrants invaded from the west and the east,
might disagree). It expresses outrage at those who question
whether some Sovietera heroes and martyrs are inventions. And
it accuses the West of scheming to undermine the Soviet Union for
decades by handing Nobel prizes to dissenting writers, inviting re
formminded officials on academic exchanges and, by the late
1980s, supporting civil society and a free press. The film’s villains
include Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, whose denuncia
tion of Stalin’s personality cult is called “90% lies”. The last Soviet
leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, is blamed for capitalist policies that—
the film asserts—destroyed a planned economy that had outper
formed America’s. There follow scenes of postSoviet chaos craft
ed to appal watching officials, involving toppled communist me
morials and mobs attacking former oppressors. Then comes the
Putin era, with proud war veterans and goosestepping troops in a
sunlit Red Square, over the strains of Russia’s national anthem. Mr
Putin is hailed for commissioning new, patriotic history books.
The film is revealingly odd. It reflects some obsessions of Pu
tinera Russia, from celebrating wartime victories to paranoia
about Western infiltration. But its defence of collectivisation and
of the planned economy would strike even Putin loyalists as bi
zarre: they believe in crony capitalism, not Marxism. Nor does the
Kremlin propaganda machine expend energy downplaying Sta
lin’s cult of personality, or insisting that longago heroes literally
existed. These choices are more Chinese than Russian. Time and
again the film defends aspects of the Stalin era that bring to mind
Communist China’s founder, Mao Zedong. Mao set in motion rural
famines and political purges that killed millions. His planned
economy left the country bankrupt. He ordered the masses to
learn from the faked or invented achievements of model com
munes and model heroes, often to disastrous effect. Meanwhile
the film praises aspects of Mr Putin’s record that also apply to Mr
Xi. China’s leader has had history textbooks rewritten and passed
laws against disrespecting martyrs and heroes. Under Mr Xi, such
values as freedom of speech are called tools of Western subver
sion, designed to topple the party through “peaceful evolution”.Backing Russia’s war is good domestic politics
Above all, the film helps Mr Xi by suggesting that intensely perso
nalised rule is no bad thing, at one point showing young Russians
kissing images of Mr Putin. Later this year Mr Xi is expected to
seek a third term as party chief, upending norms put in place after
the horrors of Mao’s decadeslong reign. Reports about screenings
of the documentary end in strikingly similar ways: officials stress
the importance of “correct” history, then conclude that what mat
ters most is loyalty to the Communist Party of China and to Mr Xi.
There is a warning here for foreign governments wondering
why Mr Xi will not repudiate Mr Putin’s crimes. China’s support
for Russia is in part geopolitical, with Mr Putin seen as an irre
placeable comrade in a fight with America. But it involves domes
tic political calculations, too. Chinese ideologues see benefits in
identifying Mr Xi’s brand of nationalism withMrPutin’s. As long
as that holds true, asking Mr Xi to disown Russiaand side with the
West is like asking him to break with himself.nChaguan
Don’t underestimate Xi Jinping’s ideological bond with Vladimir Putin