The Economist April 16th 2022 MiddleEast&Africa 41
Financingterrorism
Following the money
D
efeatinginsurgenciesishardand
dangerous work. Most of all, according
to a book on the subject by John Nagl, a re
tired American soldier, it requires pa
tience. He likens it to eating soup with a
knife. That makes the rapid successes
achieved by a hotchpotch of African forces
against jihadists affiliated to Islamic State
(is) in northern Mozambique in the past
year all the more remarkable.
The violent jihadist insurgency that has
engulfed the northern Mozambican prov
ince of Cabo Delgado since 2017 had
claimed perhaps 3,200 lives by the middle
of 2021. Yet it attracted little outside atten
tion until a year ago, when the militants
swept into the coastal town of Palma,
where they killed dozens of people, includ
ing several foreigners, and halted progress
on a huge gas project. Soon after, Rwanda
sent the first of about 2,000 troops. These
were followed by about 1,000 more sol
diers from eight other African countries,
led by South Africa. In short order these
forces have driven the insurgents out of
most of the province’s populated areas.
Yet even as South Africa earns praise for
battling jihadists in Mozambique, it is also
gaining a reputation as a hub and money
laundering centre for jihadists from across
the continent. In March America’s Treasu
ry imposed sanctions on four people in
South Africa accused of raising money and
recruiting for isactivities and branches
across Africa. The American action cast
new light on the connections between is’s
core in Iraq and Syria, which has suffered
crushing defeats in recent years, and its
growing networks in Africa.
In 2019 isreceived pledges of allegiance
from two rebel groups almost 2,000km
apart that seemed to have little connec
tion: the insurgents in Cabo Delgado and
the Allied Democratic Forces (adf), a
Ugandan outfit notorious for massacres in
eastern Congo (see map). These affiliates
have since mounted attacks not just at
home but also in Tanzania and Uganda.
Their entrepot is South Africa. Police
sources there say that suspected members
of the adfand other jihadists from as far
afield aswestAfrica andSomaliafreely
hobnobinthecountrywithlikeminded
locals.DozensofSouthAfricanswentto
SyriaandIraqtojoinisintheheydayofits
socalled caliphate. Among those who
triedtogoaretwinbrothers,BrandonLee
andTonyLeeThulsie,whowerearrested
inSouthAfricain 2016 andjailedthisyear
forterroristoffences.SouthAfricanshave
beenspottedamongthejihadistsinMo
zambique,accordingtoSouthAfricanoffi
cials.Somehavebuiltnetworksathome.
Take FarhadHoomer, abusinessman
fromthecoastalcityofDurban.America’s
Treasuryslappedsanctionsonhim,alleg
ingthathehadestablishedandledanis
cellinDurbanandthathewasincontact
withtheadfinCongo.Itclaimedthathe
fundedhiscellbyraisingmorethan1m
rand($69,000)throughextortionandkid
napping.Hedeniestheallegations.Also
placedundersanctionswasAbdellaHus
seinAbadigga,anEthiopianwithalleged
linkstoisinSomalia,whomtheTreasury
accusedofextortingmoneyfrommembers
oftwomosquesinSouthAfrica thathe
senttoisgroupselsewhere.
Itisnotclearhowmuchmoneyflows
fromSouthAfricatoterrorgroupsbutoffi
cials reckon it may add up to hundreds of
thousands of dollars a year. Investigators
believe that a good chunk of this money
comes from crime of one sort or another,
possibly including drug smuggling
(though there is little public evidence for
this). From South Africa it then takes many
paths. Police in Kenya, for example, recent
ly arrested a middleman who had received
money from South Africa and sent it on to
suspected militants in Mozambique and
adfoperatives in Uganda.
Counterterrorism officials in the re
gion suspect that isis using its money to
buy the loyalty of radicals associated with
alShabab, the Somali affiliate of alQaeda,
is’s rival. Defections of alShabab loyalists
have “a lot to do with money”, says a Somali
intelligence officer. iscurrently backs an
alShabab splinter group in Puntland,
northern Somalia. uninvestigators moni
toring the group have found evidence that
one of its commanders has visited Mozam
bique to train insurgents there.
Cutting these financial cords will not be
easy. South Africa’s security institutions
are poorly run, underresourced, riddled
with corruption and infiltrated by crimi
nals. The Financial Action Task Force, a
moneylaundering watchdog, says South
Africa has “failed to demonstrate that it is
effectively identifying, investigating or
prosecuting terrorist financiers”. One frus
trated South African cop following the is
money trail says his bosses have ignored
most of the cases he has sent them. “It
makes it harder for us to reallydiginto
where all the money is beinggenerated
from in the first place,” he sighs.n
N AIROBI AND PRETORIA
How jihadists in Congo and Mozambique arelinkedtoSouthAfricanmoneymen
SOUTH
AFRICA
TANZANIA
RWANDA
KENYA
UGANDA
CHAD SUDAN
SOMALIA
ETHIOPIA
CONGO
Pretoria
Nairobi
Durban
MOZAMBIQUE
Kampala
Cabo
Delgado
Puntland
INDIANOCEAN
Jihadists,Jan222
Source:AEI’sCritical
ThreatsProject
Activeinsurgency
Low-levelinsurgency
Riskofcells
Attackcellspresent
1,000 km
If only the money trail were as clear