50 The Economist April 16th 2022
International
GeopoliticsFriends like these
W
hen theleaders of the world’s two
biggest democracies held a virtual
meeting on April 11th, Narendra Modi, In
dia’s prime minister (no. 1) approvingly
quoted President Joe Biden (no. 2) back to
himself: “Democracies can deliver,” Mr
Modi declared. But when it came to the war
in Ukraine, just what it was that democra
cies should be delivering went unspeci
fied. Both men worried about the plight of
Ukrainian civilians. Although Mr Biden
left no doubt whom he blamed for their
suffering, Mr Modi sounded less certain.
Rather than point a finger at Russia, he
called for “an independent inquiry” into
the horrors reported from the Ukrainian
town of Bucha.
India is perhaps the most inconvenient
of the serial abstainers from the West’s
campaign to punish Vladimir Putin, Rus
sia’s president, for invading Ukraine. But it
is far from alone. In Asia, the Middle East,
Africa and Latin America, even longtimeallies and clients of America are rebuffing
its entreaties to impose sanctions on Rus
sia or merely to criticise it.
Few countries have been as brazen as
Pakistan, which, under its sinceousted
prime minister, Imran Khan, signed a trade
deal with Russia shortly after the United
Nations voted on March 2nd to deplore the
invasion and demand that Russia with
draw. But many are refraining from either
openly criticising or penalising Russia,
owing to commercial incentives, ideologi
cal commitments, strategic ambitions or
simple fear. Turkey, for example, has eco
nomic reasons to cling to the sidelines—it
buys 45% of its gas from Russia—but it also
has citizens endangered by the war. On
March 13th Turkey’s foreign minister an
nounced he was negotiating with Russia to
extract dozens of Turkish residents from
the Ukrainian city of Mariupol, which was
being crushed to rubble by Russian bombs.
A month later, many remain trapped. For its part, India has a number of rea
sons to avoid antagonising Russia: its tra
dition of neutrality in global conflict, its
strategic priority of confronting China, its
dependence on Russian military equip
ment. As an added incentive, democracy it
self may argue for staying on the fence:
“pulling the lion’s tail” by refusing Ameri
ca or Britain plays well with the domestic
audience. For all these reasons, when
asked why India will not ally with America
in this democratic cause, the mandarins
who run its deep state and shape its foreign
policy respond with looks of cynical scorn.
It is tricky to gauge the degree to which
countries resisting Russia’s isolation
might undermine the sanctions regime or
ganised by the West. But considered as a
bloc, the 40 countries that opposed or ab
stained from the unresolution condemn
ing the invasion will probably matter more
in terms of geopolitics than economics.
Together they account for a quarter of the
world’s gdpand 20% of its exports. Yet
they are not very important to the Russian
economy. Their median gdpper person is
about a third of the global average, suggest
ing they may not muster demand for much
more than the quarter of Russian exports
they already consume. And they lack the
capacity to provide the more sophisticated
goods and services Russia once bought
from the West. B UENOS AIRES, DELHI, DUBAI, ISTANBUL, MEXICO CITY, NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO
Why so much of the world, including big democracies, won’t stand up to Russia