7defi nition of life, since a nervous system implies the possibility of sensation
(Fishbach and Fishbach 2004 ). The early embryo up to this point was termed the
“pre-embryo” in 1985, and notwithstanding arguments that this term was merely
invented to justify embryonic research, the 14-day limit has generally been accepted
and adopted in various jurisdictions globally (Mulkay 1997 ).
Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) stipulates that
all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights (UDHR, Article 2),
the term “born” was used to exclude the fetus and embryo from the human rights
granted in this declaration. Arguments to amend the UDHR by deleting this term
were proposed but rejected (Copelan et al. 2005 ). Even the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC, Article 6) only recognizes the right to life from birth
(Copelan et al. 2005 ). Although the US Supreme Court has never ruled on the con-
stitutional status of human embryos outside the body, it has ruled that fetuses are
not persons within the meaning of the 14th Amendment and accordingly have no
constitutional rights (Robertson 2010 ). This ruling will presumably also extend to
embryos, but although the American Convention on Human Rights ( ACHR 1969 ,
Article 4) stipulates that every person’s right to life must be respected, that this
right must be protected from the moment of conception, and that no one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his life, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
clarifi ed that this right is not absolute (Center for Reproductive Rights undated ). In
the matter of Paton v United Kingdom ( 1980 ), the European Commission on
Human Rights held that the language of Article 2(1) of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) which provides that “Everyone’s right to life shall be
protected by law” (ECHR Article 2 ) does not include the unborn and acknowl-
edged that the recognition of an absolute right to life before birth would be contrary
to the object and purpose of the said convention. In Vo v France ( 2004 ), the
European Court of Human Rights affi rmed that the unborn child is not regarded as
a “person” directly protected by Article 2 of the ECHR and that if the unborn child
does have a right to life, such right is implicitly limited by the mother’s rights and
interests. However, these cases refer specifi cally to unborn children in utero as
opposed to embryos outside the human body ( Roe v Wade 1973 ; Planned
Parenthood v Casey 1992 ).
However, on 18 December 2014 in the patent matter of International Stem Cell
Corporation v Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks ( 2013 ),
the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that embryos created through par-
thenogenesis, being unable to develop into human beings and having only one set of
DNA, do not qualify as a human embryo having regard to the defi nition thereof
contained in the European Parliament and Council’s Directive 98/44/EC ( 1999 )
regarding the legal protection of biotechnological inventions dated 6 July 1999, and
were therefore patent eligible.
The debate about the moral status of the embryo is not regarded as an ethical or
legal one only. There is an obligation to do everything possible to alleviate the suf-
fering of existing human beings, and if hESC research is the method to such a
means, there is a moral duty to pursue it (Nuffi eld Council on Bioethics 2000 ).
1 Stem Cell Therapy: Accepted Therapies, Managing the Hope of Society...