1216 THE STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY
of punishment. He begins by outlining the various opinions of moral philosophers on
the function or purpose of punishment in current society—"for example, revenge or
deterrence" (p. 55), or more specifically (p. 57) "as a means of rendering harmless, of
preventing further harm ... as payment of a debt to the creditor in any form (even one
of emotional compensation)... as a means of isolating disturbance of balance."
Nietzsche does not deny the force of these current utilities (and may well
approve them as a matter of personal or public morality). Rather, he wants to resolve
the different issue of the historical origin of punishment in human evolution (a quest
highlighted in his book's title, The Genealogy of Morals). He recognizes that
confusion between his question of historical origin and the unchallenged
documentation of current utility poses the greatest barrier towards resolution. The
opening sentences of this section outline the problem (p. 54): "Now another word on
the origin and purpose of punishment—two problems which are separate, or ought to
be: unfortunately people usually throw them together. How have the moral
genealogists reacted so far in this matter? Naively, as is their wont: they highlight
some 'purpose' in punishment, for example revenge or deterrence, then innocently
place the purpose at the start, as causa fiendi [cause of making] of punishment—and
have finished. But 'purpose of law' is the last thing we should apply to the history of
the emergence of law."
I would not, in this book, so highlight this crisp dissection of a key problem in
evolutionary biology as well—the distinction between historical origin and current
utility—if Nietzsche had not generalized the issue as central to all historical study,
and if he had not so clearly explicated both the biological meanings, and the
implications for adaptationist analysis as well.
Nietzsche labels the need to distinguish historical origin from current utility as
"the major point of historical method" (p. 57). "There is no more important
proposition for all kinds of historical research" (p. 55), he adds, just before presenting
his clearest statement of the general issue: "Namely, that the origin or the emergence
of a thing and its ultimate usefulness, its practical application and incorporation into a
system of ends, are toto coelo [entirely, or literally 'to the highest heavens'] separate;
that anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted
anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and directed to a new purpose."
To resolve his particular issue, Nietzsche needs to make this separation because
he wishes to locate the origin of punishment in the almost inevitable manifestation of
a primal will to power. But if we make the mistake of equating an admitted and
efficacious modern utility (in deterrence or resolution of debt, for example) with the
ground of origin as well, we will never understand the genealogy of morals. Again,
and contrary to the common misunderstanding, Nietzsche does not wish to advocate
historical origin as a source of validation. Quite to the contrary, he argues that we
need to understand the reasons for origin in order to analyze the source and strength
of the underlying motivation (whatever the current utility), thus giving us better
insight into our actions and natures.