Internalism and Laws of Form 315
from the continent; in such a strongly social profession as science, even the most
profoundly idiosyncratic thinker lies embedded in his contemporary world (see
Chapter 11 on the leading 20th century British formalist, D'Arcy Thompson). Yet,
as I have emphasized throughout this chapter—for the theme must play a central
role in any proper understanding of Darwin and the essence of Darwinian theory—
formalism remained a minority position in Britain, poorly adapted and
fundamentally alien to a culture freighted with several centuries of functionalist
preference.
As a fitting illustration of this functionalist milieu, consider Britain's pre-
eminent philosopher of science in the generation of Owen and Darwin: William
Whewell. (As author of a Bridgewater Treatise, Whewell cannot be considered a
neutral commentator.) The first edition (1837) of his most important and
comprehensive work, History of the Inductive Sciences, presents a functionalist
perspective, almost as rigid and exclusive as Paley's. By the third edition (1869),
however, Whewell claimed a change of heart, stating that Owen had provoked the
alteration. Yet Whewell's "revised" attitude remains quintessential^ functionalist, if
anything even more so because he now recognizes and understands the formalist
alternative, but relegates this "newcomer" to marginality. Whewell begins by
providing a fair and concise contrast of the two schools as portrayed in the debate
between Geoffroy and Cuvier—though he scarcely hides his preferences in judging
functionalism as "truths which are irresistibly apparent and which may therefore be
safely taken as the bases of our reasonings":
According to this theory [Geoffroy's], the structure and functions of
animals are to be studied by the guidance of their analogy only [homology
in modern parlance]; our attention is to be turned, not to the fitness of the
organization for any end of life or action, but to its resemblance of the other
organizations by which it is gradually derived from the original type ... On
the other hand, the plan of the animal, the purpose of its organization in the
support of its life, the necessity of the functions to its existence, are truths
which are irresistibly apparent, and which may therefore be safely taken as
the bases of our reasonings. This view has been put forward as the doctrine
of the conditions of existence: it may also be described as the principle of a
purpose in organization; the structure being considered as having the
function for its end (1869, p. 483).Whewell then states the chief claim for functionalist primacy: body parts exist
primarily "for" their useful action: "That the parts of the body of animals are made
in order to discharge their respective offices, is a conviction which we cannot
believe to be otherwise than an irremovable principle of the philosophy of
organization, when we see the manner in which it has constantly forced itself upon
the minds of zoologists and anatomists in all ages" (1869, p. 489). "In the
organized world," Whewell adds (1869, p. 491), "we may and must adopt the
belief, that organization exists for its purpose, and that the apprehension of the
purpose may guide us in seeing the meaning of the organization."