The Modern Synthesis as a Limited Consensus 575
had adopted in this period of hardening. He spoke, with some irony, of the
consensus that "has come to be known as the 'synthetic theory of evolution' but has
also been variously termed 'selection theory,' 'neo-Mendelian theory,' and 'neo-
Darwinian theory.' It is unfortunate that occasionally it is called 'the theory of
evolution,' as if no other could exist" (Olson, 1960, p. 524).
Olson then identified three aspects of the logic and sociology of the synthetic
theory that, in veering towards dogmatism, made him uncomfortable. First, the
theory had become flexible enough to encompass all possible results almost a
priori, thus setting itself no challenges for potential refutation:
The feeling of a slight sense of frustration in the elasticity involved in
developing a universal explanation is hard to avoid... There is little or
nothing that cannot be explained under the selection theory, and, at present,
this theory appears to be unique in this respect (1960, p. 530)... This
possible danger is amply revealed in some studies of the last decade which
seem more concerned with fitting results into the current theory than with
evaluation of results in terms of a broader outlook. Further, of course, much
research is conceived and carried out within the framework of the theory,
and, no matter what its excellence, is not likely to break out of thisframework (1960, p. 536).^
Second, the synthesists themselves often haughtily dismiss those who
disagree as misguided, if not obtuse: "The statement is made, in effect, that those
who do not agree with the synthetic theory do not understand evolution and are
incapable of so doing, in most cases because they think typologically... Some
avid proponents of the synthetic theory would appear to ... eliminate as competent
students of evolution, because of their inability to understand the theory, those who
may disagree" (1960, pp. 526-527; Olson's italics).
Third, the success of consensus and consequent derision has silenced most
doubters, but their numbers may be large and their questions cogent: "There exists,
as well, a generally silent group of students engaged in biological pursuits who
tend to disagree with much of the current thought but say and write little ... It is, of
course, difficult to judge the size and composition of this silent segment, but there
is no doubt that the numbers are not inconsiderable. Wrong or right as such opinion
may be, its existence is important and cannot be ignored or eliminated as a force in
the study of evolution" (1960, pp. 523-524). As a paleontologist, Olson expressed
most unhappiness with the "consistency argument" that awarded the synthetic
theory hegemony over all scales of macroevolution—a misplaced confidence
achieved by extrapolating, by fiat more than by evidence, a process that
undoubtedly works in the ecological here and now to a sufficient explanation for
all major changes occurring over hundreds of millions of years (1960, pp. 531 and
533).
Yet, however cogent Olson's doubts, his attempt to inject more pluralism and
skepticism into evolutionary theory ultimately failed—and for a valid reason from
the orthodox point of view. A successful whistle blower must proceed beyond the
exposure of faults in his boss's domain; he must also suggest a path towards greater
accuracy and fuller explanation. And, on this