POTENTIAL BETWEEN BRAINS 249Th e ancestors of species that form fi sh shoals, bird fl ocks, and mam-
mal herds had already evolved improved cognitive systems (and bigger
brains) for reasons other than social existence. Th e dynamics of these
social groups are less encompassing than in the social insects. Th ey or ga-
nize a relatively restricted range of individual be hav iors into a narrower
range of group be hav iors, based mainly around passive food foraging and
prey avoidance.
Im por tant exceptions to such limited, rather passive, patterns of social
be hav ior are those where individuals fully cooperate in hunting. It has
been suggested that even some fi sh engage in cooperative hunting. In a
review, Redouan Bshary and colleagues say that “co- operative hunting in
the sense that several predators hunt the same prey si mul ta neously is
widespread in fi sh, especially in mackerels, which have been described
[as] herding their prey.” It is obser ved that “individuals play diff er ent roles
during such hunts (splitting the school of prey, herding the prey) and re-
frain from single hunting attempts until the prey is in a favorable posi-
tion.”^15 Similar be hav ior has been reported in other fi sh species.
Such reports are startling, because the cognitive demands of true
cooperation are very great. Acting jointly in a dynamic activity like hunt-
ing requires a rapidly updating shared conceptualization of a fl eeting tar-
get. Th at alone places high demands on attention, both to the target and to
other pack members. In addition, individuals need to form momentary
sub- conceptions corresponding with their complementary place in the
global perception— a kind of dual cognition. Fi nally, the coordination be-
tween global and individual cognitions must give rise to individual mo-
tor responses that are also globally coordinated. In that coordination,
such objects as bodies of water, trees, rocks, and ground undulations need
to be negotiated, all on timescales of seconds or even milliseconds.
It suggests highly refi ned regulations emerging among the individual
cognitions of participants. Again, let us call that be hav ior epicognitive by
analogy with the epige ne tic regulations among cells in development (and
likewise based on emerging attractor landscapes). Although prob ably
rudimentary in fi shes, such regulations appear more strikingly in certain
mammals.
In mammals, however, there is a big diff erence. Mammals generally
evolved from reptiles as terrestrial beings. To survive on land, they had
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