Genes, Brains, and Human Potential The Science and Ideology of Intelligence

274 HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

HUMANS ONLY INDIVIDUATE

THROUGH CULTURE

Since ancient Greece, philosopher- psychologists have known that we can
only become recognizable humans through social interaction. Th at also
seems to have been recognized in tribal socie ties. In an interview in New
Scientist in April 2006, Desmond Tutu told us that “in the African Bantu
language, the word ubuntu means that a person becomes a person only
through other people.”^19 Th at recognition has become lost in the meth-
odological individualism of the Western world. But real understanding
of cognitive potential and cognitive diff erences becomes diffi cult without
it. So let us remind ourselves of that.
True cooperation is seen when even as few as two individuals act
jointly on a task. Th is is already a challenge for perception and cognition.
Each partner needs to form momentary perceptions corresponding
with their complementary place in the global perception while holding
on to a shared conception of the fi nal goal. Th en the coordination be-
tween global and individual perceptions must give rise to individual mo-
tor responses that are also globally coordinated. And all this is rapidly
changing in seconds or even milliseconds.
In the pro cess, the partners jointly reveal a depth of forces in nature,
and in each other, that would not be experienced by either one operating
alone. We have already seen what happens even with two musicians co-
ordinating key- tapping for a few minutes. With more realistic tasks like
moving an object, such coordination is already much more demanding.
Each has now to take account of that new complexity of forces—of mass,
gravity, shape, and friction— for the joint action to become coordinated. In
jointly lift ing an object, say, the natu ral relations between forces of each
individual and the actions of one participant all become conditioned by
the actions of the other. In addition, of course, all these forces have to be
geared to a shared conception of joint purpose.
In hunting and defensive actions against predators, the task is even
more complex, because the object is itself active, and reactive, against the
joint action. Th e dynamics of action and reaction are not even remotely
experienced by noncooperating animals. Th ey cannot be regulated
through a narrow range of ste reo typed chemical, gestural, or other signals
or the networks of lesser brains.

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