HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 283Take basic knowledge of objects, for example. In prehuman cognitive
systems, co- variations picked up from objects— how aspects of them
change together over space and time— self- organize into object concepts.
Th ese concepts are co- variation clusters that share features and thus pre-
dictabilities. (I have also referred to them as attractors and grammars). If a
rabbit spots a bushy tail and a red coat in the bushes, it “knows” what can
be predicted and acts accordingly. Th at is the rabbit’s knowledge of foxes.
However, human use of objects virtually never consists of isolated cog-
nitions around isolated entities. We know objects— their properties,
uses, and so on— through the patterns of social relationships of which
they are an integral part. Social action with objects reveals far more than
purely personal encounters possibly could, going much deeper than sur-
face appearances and superfi cial physical properties. Th is is especially
the case for artifacts that are produced precisely for the use of others. Th e
infant’s developing knowledge of spoons and forks extends far beyond
their immediate utility and includes patterns of social relations surround-
ing their use.
Such socially embedded knowledge of objects transforms and extends
individual cognitions. For example, social cooperation requires us to be
jointly explicit about our knowledge, as in sharing it, teaching it, work-
ing together with it, and communicating about it. But to share with others
our experience of an object and what it predicts, it must be ascribed to
a category, defi ned by a word (e.g., “fox,” “ table,” “furniture,” “artifact”).
Th rough the discourse tools of speech and writing, these more explicit
knowledge structures can then be publicly reworked and extended into
more complex forms. Th ey can be further interrelated, used as meta phors
for exploring new domains, and so on.
Th e same applies to knowledge of all experience. In fostering refl ective
abstraction, social engagement radically alters personal cognition, a pro-
cess that creates enormous cognitive potential in people. As concepts
become extended in vast knowledge networks, predictabilities about the
world become much deeper, and far more potent, than any found in non-
human animals. Asking children, as in typical IQ tests, about the capital
of France, or the boiling point of water, completely misses this quality of
knowledge. Suggesting that such questions indicate a child’s true learn-
ing potential or knowledgeability is grossly misleading.
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