HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 285
Since the time of ancient Greece, it has been the task of scientifi c
research to systematize that confi rmatory pro cess through scholarly
analy sis and discourse. Even prior to the more recent scientifi c revolution,
this pro cess radically altered some of our interpretations of everyday
observations. For example, it revolutionized perceptions of a fl at earth,
or the geocentric structure of the universe. In this way, predictabilities of
future states from current conditions become ever more precise, per-
mitting more intelligent interventions.
It is now well documented how the great fl owering of modern science
from the seventeenth century on occurred through the devising of new
knowledge- sharing procedures. Observations became more systematic,
more experimental, and better recorded for sharing and attempted repli-
cation. Observed co- variations in natu ral phenomena could be shared
by inviting others to check fi ndings. Th eoretical models could be jointly
constructed such as to be more explicit about constituents and how they
operate together. Predictions (hypotheses) could then be made and sub-
sequently tested in controlled experiments.
Th e need for all steps to be made explicit, so that they can be shared
and replicated by others, determined the logical structure of modern
empirical science. Indeed, it has been argued that the upsurge in the social
pro cesses of conferencing, collaboration, and publication among scientists
in the seventeenth and eigh teenth centuries was the single most impor tant
step in the historical development of the scientifi c method.
Th us the current methods of science grew naturally out of epicogni-
tive dynamics, and they perfectly illustrate the fruits of a cultural tool.
But the rational social procedures are also internalized by individuals as
a personal psychological tool. Doing so permits us to think scientifi cally
as individuals. Th is is another example of the transformation and exten-
sion of other wise limited cognitive abilities by cultural tools.
One obvious implication is that school tests that ask individuals to mem-
orize and reproduce details of such methods miss the point. Th ey are merely
describing individuals’ “schooling” and not successful participation in real
science. As a consequence, as mentioned in chapter 3, there is prob ably little
association between such test scores and future success as scientists.
Scientifi c knowledge and reasoning have, of course, been much as-
sisted by other cultural tools. In par tic u lar, mathe matics was developed
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