NotNormativelyHuman 163
onlyafewthatwillbediscussedinthischapter.Inthisfashion,biology-
based norms became part of the lexicon of U.S.-American nationalism;
in fact, they have even been the stage on which some of the most
important controversies animating that exceptionalist culture, past and
present, have been playing themselves out: race and gender, age,
disability,immigration,terrorism,etc.
Before turning to some of these exceptionalisms, an attempt at
theoretical scaffolding must be made here. In order to scan cultural
resonancesofbiology-basedregimesofnormativity—andthesearetruly
wide-ranging—, I will in the next section first explicate the
understanding of norms that guides the following argument. In the
secondpartofthischapterIwillthenofferreadingsoftwocriticalsites
where these regimes impact most forcefully on the meaning of human
life: aging or old age, and disability. These sites can be usefully
accessedbywayoftheworkofCanguilhem,Foucault,andHabermas.I
will focus on their contributions because regardless of their otherwise
substantial theoretical disagreements, all three writers put emphasis less
on the specific content of norms and highlight instead their presence in
theeverydaypracticeofindividualsandcommunities.Inthisway,their
worktiesinwiththepresentfocusontheculturalresonancesofclusters
ofbio-basednormativity.
NormsasImaginaryGrammarofCulturalOughtness
Norms regulating the biosphere (like norms in general) find their
conceptualgroundingandalsotheirbroadesthorizonofreferenceinthe
dualism between things as they are and as they ought to be.Hence, and
despite deconstruction's anathema against binary oppositions, I will
situate the following reflections on biological normativity within this
verydualism,whoseessentialdynamicscanbecapturedintheHegelian
termsSeinandSollen(roughly translatable as being vs. oughtness).^10
(^10) This understanding of norms is guided by arguments taken from Luhmann,
Rechtssoziologie, esp. I, 110-15, 170-75. – Hegel is extremely critical towards
the Kantian notion ofan absolute oughtness which in hisview is a more orless
empty gesture of protest against the shortcomings of empirical reality
(Enc yclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences§ 6.38). For him, instead, "[t]he