426 RüdigerKunow
emphasis deleted),^123 the presumption that a link is thus forged between
the somatic and the semantic is at best optimistic, at worst ideological.
There is no reason why we should assume that the "intextuation" of the
somatic(deCerteau149),thecoordinationbetweenotherwise unrelated
domains of human presence in the world, should by some inner
necessity produce a result that does justice, both to the specificity of
embodied experience and the requirements of intersubjective
communication. Even a dyed-in-the-wool constructivist such as Judith
Butler concedes this: "Although the body depends on language to be
known,thebodyalsoexceedseverypossiblelinguisticeffortofcapture"
("These Hands" 2). As I mentioned earlier, Butler is not very
forthcomingonthespecificsofthemismatchorhiatusshenotices.
I would therefore like to dwell for a moment on the idea of a hiatus
between the somatic and the semantic. The idea that embodied human
experiences cannot fully be contained in and by the available semantic
systems can be discussed in many ways; one that I have found
particularly helpful and for this reason also discussed above is Hegel's
reflection in the Phenomenology of Spirit on the inescapable but
troubled relationship of the individual with the collectivity's semantic
universe it is a part of). Hegel may be an unlikely reference in the
present context but his argument keeps the two realms of what he calls
"thenatural"and"thecultural"inacareful,dialecticalbalance—without
tryingtoweighoneagainsttheother.
Biology, I said at the beginning, is in important ways "ours;" and
embodimentisespeciallythelocationof"I."Butthis"I"is,toborrowa
phrase from Axel Honneth, always already an "I in the We" because
humans live in worlds shared with others. Our biological make-up may
be in many ways unique but we also share a significant part of it with
others, as for example contagious diseases and genetic re-engineering
show. In this context, Hegel even uses the by now over-determined
notion of "alienation": "This alienation takes place solely inlanguage,
whichhereappearsinitscharacteristicsignificance"(Phenomenologyof
Spirit308; emphasis original). Amplifying a concept elaborated earlier
(^123) Inallfairness,itmustbenotedthatLandeckerisherespeakingofaconcrete
individual case, that of Henrietta Lacks, but the overall direction ofCulturing
Lifeisinfavorofaculturalizationandtextualizationofthebiological.