rather than productive collaboration. On those occasions when they have
engaged with each other’s work, they have emphasized differences and dis-
agreements more than what they share and how they might join forces.^2 To
counter this line of discussion, I would like to demonstrate one way that the
two approaches can effectively collaborate as I take up the task of interpret-
ing “Recitatif.” Morrison invents joint protagonists, Twyla and Roberta, of
different races (one white, one black) and has Twyla tell the tale. Twyla’s nar-
ration makes it clear that the two characters know each other’s race and that
their racial difference strongly influences their relationship, but Twyla never
explicitly identifies herself or Roberta by race. In addition, Morrison frus-
trates her audience’s ability to use other cultural markers as a way to assign
racial identities to her co-protagonists. As the critical conversation to this
point demonstrates, the very salience of Morrison’s withholding of her char-
acters’ racial identity for the story’s thematic explorations of race, class, and
disability^3 can lead us to overlook other striking aspects of Morrison’s design,
including her handling of other aspects of the character narration and her
management of the overall progression. As I analyze these elements of Morri-
son’s story, I shall draw on Lisa Zunshine’s insights about metarepresentation,
Alan Palmer’s work on social minds, and various concepts I have developed
in this book. At the same time, I shall remain open to the ways in which Mor-
rison’s use of her resources may require some refinements to these theoreti-
cal constructs. In my conclusion I shall briefly reflect on my way of bringing
cognitive and rhetorical theory together. I begin by elaborating on reasons
why rhetorical and cognitive narrative theory should be theoretical allies.
The approaches share at least two important principles and one impor-
tant mode of inquiry. Principle 1: Narrative is a purposeful communicative
exchange between authors and readers. This book has been an exercise in
- See the exchange between Alan Palmer and me (Palmer, “Attributions,” and Phelan,
“Cognitive Narratology”) and the one between David Herman, on the cognitive side, and Peter
J. Rabinowitz and me, on the rhetorical side, in Herman et al., Narrative Theory: Core Con-
cepts and Critical Debates (where both approaches are also juxtaposed to a feminist approach,
advanced by Robyn Warhol, and an antimimetic approach, advanced by Brian Richardson).
These exchanges are respectful, but the participants focus on where they diverge. For recent
essays that emphasize the compatibility of rhetorical and cognitive approaches, see Rabinowitz
and Bancroft (“Euclid”) and Rabinowitz (“Cognitive Flavor”). - Elizabeth Abel’s excellent “Black Writing, White Reading: Race and the Politics of Fem-
inist Interpretation” highlights this feature of the story, and many subsequent essays explore its
th ematic consequences. See especially Marie Knoflíčková and David Goldstein-Shirley. Howard
Sklar takes up the worthwhile question whether the disabled Maggie functions as what David
Mitchell and Sharon Snyder call a “narrative prosthesis,” that is, the use of a disabled character
(and negative stereotypes associated with the disability) as a device by which a narrative accom-
plishes its effects. See their Narrative Prosthesis: Disability and the Dependencies of Discourse. I
will return to this issue later in the chapter.
TONI MORRISON’S DETERMINATE AMBIgUITY • 151