Somebody Telling Somebody Else A Rhetorical Poetics Of Narrative

(Chris Devlin) #1

book will elaborate on the principles as it puts them to work and, in some
cases, explicitly offers further commentary. I invite those readers who are
familiar with the principles or are more interested in their application to jump
to chapter 1 and return to this sketch as needed.^1
(1) Rhetorical theory subsumes the traditional view of narrative as a struc-
tured sign system representing a linked sequence of events under the broader
view that narrative is itself an event—more specifically, a multidimensional
purposive communication from a teller to an audience. The concern with pur-
pose informs the analysis of narrative phenomena, including the core ele-
ments: how has the teller tried to shape these materials in the service of her
larger ends? The focus on narrative as multileveled communication follows
from rhetorical theory’s interest in accounting for the reading experience (and
see principle number 5 for a gloss on “experience”). Consequently, rhetorical
theory is at least as interested in a narrative’s affective, ethical, and aesthetic
effects—and in their interactions—as it is in that narrative’s thematic mean-
ings. Affective effects include the range of emotional responses (from empathy
to antipathy) to characters, narrators, and even authors and to the narrative as
a whole. Affective effects can follow from and/or influence ethical effects, and
the quality of an audience’s affective and ethical engagements with a narrative
greatly influences its aesthetic effects.
(2) The rhetorical definition of narrative, “somebody telling somebody
else on some occasion and for some purpose(s) that something happened,”
describes a “default” situation rather than prescribes what all narratives
should do. The definition is designed to capture essential characteristics of
most of those works that are widely considered to be narratives in our cul-
ture, even as I recognize that individual narratives may not conform exactly
to every element of the definition. Thus, for example, I say “something hap-
pened,” because the telling of events typically occurs after their occurrence.
But I also recognize that the telling can sometimes be simultaneous with the
events (as in J.  M. Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians) or before the events
(as in the ending of Dostoyevsky’s The Gambler: “Tomorrow, tomorrow it will
all be over!”). Characterizing the definition as “default” keeps one open to
such deviations—and to the likelihood that they will be significant. See num-
ber 8 for a related principle.
(3) Rhetorical interpretation and theory are based on an a posteriori
rather than an a priori method. This principle is closely connected to num-



  1. This discussion of principles draws to some degree on the similar discussion Peter
    J. Rabinowitz and I offer in chapter 1 of Narrative Theory: Core Concepts and Critical Debates.
    But where that discussion identifies six principles, this one expands to ten. I am deeply grateful
    to Peter for his collaboration in that discussion and in so many others over the years.


PRINCIPLES OF RHETORICAL POETICS • 5

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