The Sunday Times - UK (2022-04-24)

18

WORLD NEWS

the May and Johnson governments. While he was foreign secretary, Johnson sidestepped implementing the findings of the foreign affairs committee and later, as prime minister, delayed the release of the intelligence committee’s report. Brit- ain did not independently sanction any oligarch with known UK assets until Rus- sia invaded Ukraine on February 24. There were a number of reasons for this inertia. A significant one, some claim, was the cosy relationship between the government and wealthy Russians who entertained ministers; gave money to the Conservative Party; brought wealth into London; and acquired impor- tant national assets such as a newspaper and Premier League football clubs. Other senior politicians say the government was simply too frightened of provoking the Russian giant. Sir Gerald Howarth, a former minister for international security strategy, describes the failure to bolster Ukraine’s defences as a “betrayal”. He said: “We’ve given [Putin] green light after green light after green light. After the [invasion of ] Crimea in 2014 he was able to act with complete impunity; he was able to act with complete impunity over the [Salisbury attack]. What the hell are these people playing at? We’ve never challenged him

... Putin has calculated we are too weak,
too wet, to resist him.”
ANTIQUATED WEAPONRY
During his years as defence secretary,
between 2014 and 2017, Fallon says the
Ukrainians were “desperate” to buy Brit-
ish weapons. “[They] wanted almost
everything. They were not able to resist
the incursions into Donbas. At times they
had little more than rifles,” he said.
The Russians were equipped with
modern rocket launchers, artillery and
tanks often operated by their own highly
trained special forces while the Ukrainian
soldiers were sometimes left fighting
with only AK47s from the Soviet era.
A cabinet source was lobbying for the
government to do more for Ukraine. “We
could have given them anti-tank mis-
siles,” he said. “We could have provided
ammunition to deal with tanks. We could
have provided a lot more intelligence. We
could have provided more right across
the board. It was just nervousness on the
British side that Britain would end up in a
situation of conflict with Russia.”
There was also support from the army
leadership to help Ukraine to update its
antiquated weaponry. Fallon recalls:
“The [army] chiefs felt strongly we
should not ignore the threat on our own
continent.” But Fallon and the army lost
the argument. So the government’s
response to Kyiv’s repeated pleas for
arms was to announce in October 2014 a
package of non-lethal military assistance:
medical kits, winter clothing and equip-
ment, body armour, helmets and fuel.
Later this would be supplemented by
the provision of medical, logistical and

YEARS

WASTED

APPEASING

PUTIN

CAUGHT

NAPPING

Ministers and the military spent seven years

begging three prime ministers to arm Ukraine.

Cameron, May and Johnson all thought they

could contain Putin. How wrong they were

INVESTIGATION

versation with Sergey Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, on August 11, 2016, John- son made clear that he wanted a new “constructive” relationship with Russia. This was reported as a request for a “normalisation” of relations by the Russian foreign ministry. Arrangements were made for Johnson to become the first British minister to visit Moscow since the invasion of Ukraine. The olive branch offered to Rus- sia was not universally supported in Whitehall. The British defence attaché in Moscow is said to have repeatedly rung alarm bells about Putin’s threat and the futility of trying to repair relations. But Johnson took the opposite view. According to a cabinet colleague: “John- son used to wonder why we tried so hard to improve relationships with autocrats in the Gulf and that we weren’t trying with Moscow.” The ex-minister disagreed with this argument. “The invasion of Cri- mea should have been the end of the illu- sion,” he said. The intelligence services were also cautioning about the Russian threat. Andrew Parker, then the head of MI5, told The Guardian in November 2016 that Russia was active in the UK and using its powers “to push its foreign policy abroad in increasingly aggressive ways — involving propaganda, espionage, subversion and cyberattacks”. This was acknowledged by Johnson in parliament two months later. He accepted that “the Putin Kremlin is up to all sorts of very dirty tricks, such as cyberwarfare”, but, nonetheless, he was still keen to build bridges. “It would be folly for us further to demonise Russia or to push Russia into a corner,” he argued, “so a twin-track strategy of engagement and vigilance is what is required.” Johnson was due to meet Lavrov in Moscow in April 2017 but the trip was postponed after a chemical weapons strike in the Syrian town of Khan Shayk- hun by Assad’s Russian-backed forces. At least 89 people were killed and 500 injured in the sarin gas attack. The warnings continued. In Novem- ber, The Times reported that more than 150,000 Russian Twitter accounts — many spreadiing Putin propaganda — had weighed in on the Brexit referendum only days before the vote. Johnson was asked in a select committee hearing that month whether he had seen any Russian influence in British elections or referendums. “I haven’t seen any evidence of that,” he falteringly replied while looking at his assistant for guidance. “No, I haven’t seen, not a sau- sage, niet.” Nonetheless, on November 13, 2017, Theresa May, as prime minister, gave a ground-breaking address at the Guildhall in London in which she accused Russia of running malign cybercampaigns “to sow discord in the West and undermine our institutions”. But she was anxious not to create a new Cold War. “So while we must

infantry training by 75 “non-combat” British military personnel in co-ordina- tion with other Nato countries. However, the government’s policy of withholding weapons sales to Ukraine would be followed for another seven years. From the early days the refusal to sell arms to Kyiv was a controversial position that was criticised by MPs from both sides of the Commons and likened to the policy of appeasement against Nazi Germany in the 1930s. In a debate in February 2015 about assisting Kyiv’s armed struggle, the Conservative former defence secretary Liam Fox was one of a number of politicians to challenge the government’s decision not to sell Kyiv anti-tank weapons. “The Ukrainians need the ability to defend their homeland against a much more powerful aggressor,” Fox said. He asked the house whether the failure to “give defensive equipment to a country under threat because it might provoke a reaction from Russia” was “simply a bully’s charter that is already discredited by history?” By the time of that debate, Fox recalls, it was already “very clear what [Putin’s] pattern of behaviour was and it was very clear that Ukraine would be next”. He added: “There was no logic whatsoever in saying, ‘Well, we can’t give the Ukraini- ans the ability to defend themselves in case of provoking Putin’... it was a policy that was based on hope, not experience.” Lord Davies of Stamford, a former diplomat in Moscow and a Labour defence minister, voiced the same warning that year. He told a debate in the Lords that the West’s “derisory” reaction to the invasion of Crimea “would almost certainly encourage Putin to come back for a bigger bite elsewhere”. His words would prove prophetic. ’APOLOGIST FOR PUTIN’ When Johnson was elevated to foreign secretary after the June 2016 Brexit vote, his appointment received warm support from an unexpected source: the Kremlin. The Russian leadership believed Johnson could be the man to repair the fractious relationship. “The book of Russian-British relations has long been waiting for this page to be turned,” Maria Zakharova, the Kremlin spokeswoman, said. Johnson had been a figurehead of the successful Vote Leave campaign and the Kremlin was widely believed to support Brexit because it weakened the growing European Union superstate that was threatening to draw in key countries on its borders. Indeed, while on the Brexit campaign trail, Johnson had been described as an “apologist for Putin” by Carl Bildt, the former Swedish prime minister, for calling the EU an anti-demo- cratic “force for instability” responsible for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014. The Kremlin was certainly correct to believe that Johnson’s appointment might change relations. In his first con-

CALLING IT ‘A FAR AWAY COUNTRY’ RISKS MAKING THE SAME MISTAKE CHAMBERLAIN MADE John Whittingdale

2014 Russia invades Crimea. Ukraine asks Britain for arms but cabinet ministers “feel extremely strongly that we should do nothing to further provoke Russia”. Britain provides only non-lethal assistance. The policy of withholding weapons sales to Ukraine is followed for another seven years. February 2015 Lord Davies of Stamford, a former diplomat in Moscow and Labour defence minister, tells the Lords that the West’s reaction to the invasion of Crimea is “derisory” and will “encourage Putin to come back for a bigger bite

elsewhere”. In a Commons debate on the assistance that should be provided to Ukraine’s armed forces, the Conservative former defence secretary Liam Fox challenges the decision not to sell anti-tank weapons. He says Ukrainians need to be able to “defend their homeland against a much more powerful aggressor”. He warns that failure to defend Ukraine for fear of provoking Russia is “simply a bully’s charter that is already discredited by history”. The policy remains unchanged. August 2016 Theresa May has become prime minister and Boris

engage, which is why in the coming months the foreign secretary will be visiting Moscow”. December 2017 The Conservative minister John Whittingdale secures a debate in parliament to raise concerns about what he has witnessed during a trip to Ukraine’s Donbas region. Putin-backed forces hold control of about 20 per cent of Ukraine’s sovereign territory. Whittingdale criticises the government’s policy and suggests failing to adequately support Ukraine in its resistance to the Russian invasion would be reminiscent of Neville

November 2016 Andrew Parker, the MI5 chief, warns that Russia is “using its whole range of state organs and powers to push its foreign policy abroad in increasingly aggressive ways — involving propaganda, espionage, subversion and cyberattack”. Johnson acknowledges this but says that with regards to Russia, “a

November 2016 Andrew Parker, the MI5 chie warnsthat Russia is “using it whole range of state organs and powers to push its foreign policy abroad in increasinglyaggressive way — involving propaganda, espionage, subversion and cyberattack”. Johnson acknowledges this but says that with regards to Russia, “

twin-track strategy of engagement and vigilance is what is required”. April 2017 Johnson’s scheduled meeting with Lavrov in Moscow is postponed after a chemical weapons strike in Syria by President Assad’s Russian-backed forces. At least 89 people are killed and 500 people injured in the sarin gas attack. November 2017 In a speech May accuses Russia of running malign cybercampaigns “to sow discord in the West and undermine our institutions” but says “we also want to

Johnson is foreign secretary. In his first conversation with Sergey Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, Johnson makes clear that he wants a new “constructive” relationship with Russia.

ference, Johnson announced a new package of assistance. “We will give you the support that you need: economic support but also, of course, the defensive military support in which I am proud to say that the UK helped to lead the way.” Yet behind the public show of unity there is a different story. It is one that raises serious questions about just how much of a friend Britain has been to Ukraine since 2014. Did it do everything it could to counter the threat and did John- son really “lead the way” in arming Ukraine in readiness for its hour of need? Could Britain have done more to prevent Putin from starting a bloody invasion that has now claimed tens of thousands of lives? The Sunday Times has interviewed ministers, MPs, Ukrainian officials, civil servants and academics who describe an inertia within British policy towards Rus- sia which they believe gave Putin a gam- bler’s confidence that he would face no serious reprisals. In the years after the invasion of Cri- mea, there would be much rhetoric directed against the Kremlin from succes- sive British prime ministers and foreign secretaries. However, the words were not matched by action and a series of clear opportunities were missed to challenge Putin and his London-based allies. The same charge of inactivity can, of course, be levelled at the EU and the Nato alliance. There was a collective responsi- bility to protect Ukraine. However, Brit- ain with the United States had a moral obligation to Ukraine as signatories to the 1994 Budapest agreement that guaran- teed the country’s security in return for it surrendering its Soviet-era nuclear arsenal to Russia. While the US sent weapons to Ukraine for four years before the war began, Brit- ain repeatedly resisted doing so until it was too late. The view from Kyiv was that Britain had privately calculated that Ukraine would never be able to defend itself, so it was not worth aggravating Putin by arming its forces. Britain also appeased Putin by helping to shield in London the wealth of the oligarchs who did the Russian leader’s bid- ding. The charge against the oligarchs was that they had been allowed to steal vast sums from the Russian state by Putin and, in return, he could call on their wealth and loyalty. There were many calls for Britain to confront Putin in a way that would dem- onstrate the high cost he would have to pay for breaking international law. The pressure to take decisive action greatly increased after the Salisbury chemical weapon attack. As a result, two parliamentary inquir- ies — by the foreign affairs committee in 2018 and the intelligence and security committee in 2020 — called for sanctions to be imposed on the oligarchs in Lon- don. The committees’ recommenda- tions, however, were largely ignored by

THERE WAS NO LOGIC IN SAYING, ‘WE CAN’T ARM UKRAINE IN CASE OF PROVOKING PUTIN’ Liam Fox

INSIGHT

I

n the years after the Russian army rolled into Ukraine in 2014, the Brit- ish minister in charge of fielding requests from Kyiv for military assistance was the defence secretary, Michael Fallon. He was the man who reluctantly kept having to say “no”. Fallon now looks back on that time with bitter regret. “I and the ministry wanted to do more,” he recalls. “We were stymied and we were blocked in cabinet from sending the Ukrainians the arms they needed.” In public David Cameron, the prime minister, insisted that the Ukraine crisis could be solved only by diplomacy — and therefore it was unnecessary to provide arms to the country. This was because, according to Fallon, those at the top of government feared that arming Ukraine would draw Putin’s ire. “Some in the cabinet felt extremely strongly that we should do nothing to further provoke Russia,” Fallon said. “I felt that was absurd. The Russians didn’t need any provoking. They were already there, sending people across the border.” Britain’s policy of refusing to sell weapons to Ukraine continued for seven years. By the time Boris Johnson became foreign secretary in 2016, Russia had seized the Crimean peninsula, shot down the Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, and given military support to President Assad’s ruthless regime in Syria. Yet Johnson sought a “normalisation” of relations with Russia despite its illegal occupation of Crimea, and was a vocal advocate for the policy of sending only non-lethal military equipment to Kyiv. ‘UNWAVERING SOLIDARITY’ There had been siren calls from many of his Conservative colleagues to equip Ukraine with weapons that might deter further Russian aggression. Their argu- ments fell on deaf ears. The policy would be lifted only a few weeks before this year’s invasion. It left the Ukrainian army short of advanced weaponry. Last week, as the Russian army launched a new offensive in the country’s east, President Zelensky strongly criticised the West for failing to arm Ukraine sooner, claiming that many lives would have been saved. “Any delay in helping Ukraine gives the occupiers an opportu- nity to kill more Ukrainians,” he said. Johnson’s secret visit by train to Kyiv this month was billed by Downing Street as a show of Britain’s “unwavering” solidarity. It was a chance for Johnson to assume the role of world statesman and leave behind the career-threatening par- ties scandal at home. He shook hands with his “friend” Zelensky, walked around the city and reaffirmed Britain’s commitment to intensifying sanctions on Vladimir Putin’s Russian regime. Standing with Zelensky at a press con-

The Sunday Times - UK (2022-04-24)

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