310 Thurs
keywords of the kind that scientifi c method became have often contained
“radically different or radically variable, yet sometimes hardly noticed,
meanings and implications of meaning.”^7 In the absence of explicit ques-
tioning, the fl exibility of such important terms as “family,” “race,” “free-
dom,” or “America” has enabled very different groups and individuals to
unite around them; in the midst of struggle, it has been a valuable source
of rhetorical weaponry. While its slippery defi nition has limited its utility
in any precise, technical discussion, it has made the term ideal for what
Thomas Gieryn has called “boundary- work”—that is, attempts to fi x the
borders of science in ways that met the goals of individuals and groups
and provided them with access to valuable resources. Multiple defi nitions
of scientifi c method allowed multiple visions of science, and thus helped
to clear out cultural space for boundary- work. UFO researchers with a
desire to be included within the fold of science, for instance, have often
emphasized that scientifi c method calls for open- mindedness, while those
more orthodox scientists inclined to dispute the scientifi c pretensions of
UFOlogy have stressed the requirement of a skeptical attitude. Scientifi c
method, like science, was thus never one thing. It was many potentially
useful things.^8
Focusing on scientifi c method in this way might seem a little narrow.
After all, prominent thinkers have offered advice about the proper ways
to approach the study of nature for millennia. We might also focus on the
full range of actual activities, insofar as they are accessible to the mod-
ern historian, that people around the globe have engaged in when they
have tried to understand natural phenomena. Determining which of these
prescriptions and behaviors we should examine here, of course, requires
that we decide which are truly scientifi c. But if we accept the goal of this
volume—that is, problematizing the nature of science instead of taking it
for granted and opening it up to historical study—we cannot make such
decisions without short- circuiting our overall project. Rather than impos-
ing any particular notion of science onto the past, why not let historical
fi gures determine what counted as “scientifi c” in their own words? This
leads us to what may seem like a second symptom of myopia, namely, re-
stricting our examination to English- language (and particularly American)
discussion of “scientifi c method.” Arguably, given the prominence of the
United States as a center of scientifi c research and training for interna-
tional students after World War II, there may be some reason to privilege
American discussion. But even if no such rationale exists, focusing on En-
glish speakers is less a limitation than a beginning. In particular, it invites
comparison with non- English traditions of talking about proper means
of studying nature, from the methods of German wissenshaft to those of