316 Thurs
tion coincided with a general trend in Anglo- American culture toward
stronger boundaries, whether between regions of knowledge, organiza-
tions, or the tangible products of industry. Such boundaries helped to
organize intellectual, social, and cultural worlds whose expanding scale
challenged attempts at management.
Meanwhile, and by contrast, the public face of science took on a more
cohesive and unifi ed appearance. The late nineteenth century witnessed
the creation of additional terms that people used to make fi ner distinc-
tions between science and nonscience, including such chestnuts as “pop-
ular science” or “pseudo- science,” terms that spread, as I have already
noted, in much the same way as scientifi c method. The greater separate-
ness of science was also often refl ected in the tendency to ascribe scien-
tifi c knowledge to a special group of people called “scientists.”^33 In other
areas, too, from medicine to journalism, aspiring “professionals” sought
to claim areas of knowledge and practice for themselves. Firmer boundar-
ies between kinds of knowledge affected even the most mundane cultural
maps. Readers of American newspapers encountered more diverse and
segregated content as the end of the century neared, including special
reporting for women, sports fans, and others.^34 Likewise, in the emerging
consumer culture, the advent and growth of brand names helped to pro-
vide some order to the growing number of commercial goods.
By the closing decades of the 1800s, invocations of scientifi c method
had not yet displaced the rhetoric of fact, induction, and Bacon, which
continued to provide a widely shared resource. Stories about the history
of evolutionary ideas have sometimes depicted their poor reception by the
conservative, confi ning Baconianism that supposedly saturated Anglo-
American culture. Critics of Charles Darwin, often those writing in reli-
gious periodicals, did frequently rely on a fact- based, inductive view of
science, presenting him and his supporters as “investigating nature, not
in the interests of science properly so- called, but, consciously or uncon-
sciously, to fi nd facts to fi t a hypothesis.” An author writing in the Prince-
ton Review in 1878 claimed that Darwin’s theory “does not rest completely
on observation, and induction from such observation.” If Darwin’s ideas
found general acceptance, another columnist worried, “our own Baconian
mode of viewing nature will be quite reversed.”^35 But supporters of evo-
lution were not above the use of traditional rhetoric. During the 1870s
and 1880s, Darwin was often presented, especially in periodicals such
as Popular Science Monthly, as the cautious and unprejudiced searcher for
facts, guided by “a system of the most severe inductive philosophy,” who
accepted evolution only after it had become “an obvious inference from
facts.” Even opponents of those “ultra- evolutionists” who had suppos-