sophisticated enough to detect extremely small amounts of pesticides in food, in some
case levels in parts per trillion. Thus, food industry representatives claimed that rigid
enforcement of Delaney (that is, banning any measurable pesticide concentration)
stifled research and development of new pesticides that might have been safer than
products already on the market. Critics noted that many foods contain natural carci-
nogens, which were not regulated under Delaney, which may be more concentrated
and more potent than pesticide chemical residues. Critics also said that residues might
even have resulted from pesticide use to control fungi or bacteria that produce natural
carcinogens. In addition, they claimed that in some cases, the distinction between raw
and processed foods made no sense. The absolute amount of pesticide in a food before
and after processing might be the same, yet a tolerance could be set for the residue in
raw food and prohibited for the residue in processed food, because the residue had con-
centrated relative to the total food weight due to drying or other processing.
Proponents of the Delaney Clause argued that the public does not want to be
exposed to carcinogenic pesticides in food no matter how small the risk. With regard
to naturally occurring carcinogens in food, supporters argued that federal agencies
would not readily assess and reduce that risk, especially since natural anti-carcinogens
often are found in the same food as the carcinogens. To reduce the overall cancer risk,
therefore, they believed the federal government should minimize chemical pesticide
residues in food.
The Delaney Clause also was problematic, according to some, because it required
regulators to treat potentially carcinogenic pesticides more stringently than pesticides
that may exert other health effects. This situation set up a paradox: by stringently reg-
ulating carcinogens, the ‘‘zero-risk’’ standard Section 409 may have reduced the safety
of some foods. Section 409 allowed approval of pesticide residues that posed greater
risks than residues of carcinogens which Section 409 did not permit, because many
registered pesticide products have health effects other than cancer. For this reason,
the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences recommended
in 1987 that all pesticide residues in food, whether raw or processed, should be regu-
lated on the basis of a consistent ‘‘negligible-risk’’ standard.^12FQPA MandatesA key expressed purpose of the FQPA is to coordinate pesticide registration under
FIFRA with FFDCA tolerances to ensure that any pesticide approved for use on food
would leave only a ‘‘safe’’ residue. The FFDCA, as amended by the FQPA, defined
‘‘safe’’ to mean that the EPA has determined there is ‘‘a reasonable certainty that no
harm will result from aggregate exposure...including all anticipated dietary expo-
sures and all other exposures for which there is reliable information.’’ The FQPA
directed the EPA to reevaluate all existing tolerances for food-use pesticides against
this safety standard: 33 percent by August 3, 1999, 66 percent by August 3, 2002,
and 100 percent by August 3, 2006. The FQPA required the EPA to consider toler-
ances for the riskiest pesticides first.72 | Pesticides