104 Maarten Franssen
good and poor pumps, and between good and poor (or rather bad) hearts. The terms used
in these expressions—supposed, ought, good, poor—do not belong to the descriptive
vocabulary of science.
The normative aspects of the notion of “function” have served as a touchstone in
the debate between rival theories. Adherents of etiological or proper-function theories
(see section 7.2) have taken the normative character of function as obvious, and
judge theories by the extent that they can give an account of it. Naturally these
researchers emphasize that normative statements related to functions are justifi ed
on the theories they propose. Proponents of causal-role theories (see again section 7.2),
which meet with diffi culties in accommodating the normative character of functions,
argue, on the other hand, that it is in fact a mistake to hold that the function
concept is inherently normative. They seek to show that the normative statements
at issue can be reconstructed as more innocuous descriptive ones, which their theories
can handle. It is therefore a matter of considerable importance for the debate among
the various theories of function whether the normative character of functions can be
vindicated.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In section 7.3 I investigate how exactly
the theories that claim to be able to account for the normativity of function go about doing
this. Next, in section 7.4, I propose a precise interpretation of the central normative
statements, since, in saying that a mere object “ought to” do something, one cannot be
taken literally. In my interpretation, such statements express that one is justifi ed in
holding certain expectations concerning an item’s behavior. In section 7.5 I aim to show
that researchers are less prepared to apply normative judgments than they are to attribute
proper functions, and that they are less prepared to attribute proper functions than their
theories allow them to. This shows that normativity cannot be considered to be inherent
in any current, technically defi ned concept of function. Section 7.6 briefl y extends
the arguments from sections 7.3 and 7.4 to normative statements that talk of good and
poor functioning. In section 7.7 I extend the analysis of section 7.4 by sketching
how functions play a role in an account of “true” normativity, to which the formation of
beliefs and the choice of actions by intentional beings are central. Finally, in section 7.8,
I draw my main conclusion, which is that all normativity traditionally associated with the
concept of “function” derives from human intentionality, either with respect to the justifi -
cation of beliefs about a functional item or with respect to reasons for certain actions with
respect to a functional item. None of the various notions of function as they are applied,
for explanatory purposes, in biology and the social sciences, can be treated as inherently
normative; only a notion of “function” that refers directly to human beliefs and human
actions can. I start, however, with a brief exposé of the currently prevailing theories of
function.