124 Maarten Franssen
- An F-er is a device designed to have the function F. F-ing is the act of using the device for its intended
function F. So an F-er is designed for the purpose of F-ing, or to be used for F-ing. - This is how I interpret Dancy’s suggestion in Dancy (2006b: 60–61).
- Note that when an object is a malfunctioning knife, this would ipso facto be a reason not to believe that one
has a reason to use it for cutting. The question of what one is justifi ed to believe therefore cannot be settled by
the two facts that an object is known to be designed as a knife and that it is malfunctioning, since we then merely
have two reasons canceling each other. Note also in section 7.4 that where a distinction is made between what
one is rationally justifi ed in believing and what one is morally justifi ed in believing, the notion of being rationally
justifi ed in believing something can be analyzed in terms of the various reasons one has for believing it, but this
may not work for the notion of being morally justifi ed in believing something. - Cf. Hardcastle (2002: 149): “We prefer to think in organismic terms.”
- Cf. the following quotation from Lewens (2004: 108), who, as an adept of a CR-type of function theory,
denies a diseased pair of kidneys a function and explains our insistence on its malfunctioning rather than lacking
a function “because they persist in failing to provide a benefi t that we desire and that we have grown to expect.”
Here there is a reference to expectations but also desires that we have concerning the behavior of our organs,
similar to expectations of and desires for the proper functioning of our tools. The next step is the suggestion that
we should consider repairing or replacing our failing kidneys. See also Lewens (2007) for a view that is similar
to mine concerning several of the issues addressed in this chapter. - It has been argued (Vermaas and Houkes 2003) that the PF theory cannot account for all aspects of artifact
functions. I do not fi nd the argument convincing and do not regard the diffi culty as one central to the debate on
function.
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