Conceptual Conservatism 129
with the burgeoning knowledge provided by the sciences. This is to aim at a “wide refl ec-
tive equilibrium” of one sort or another, to produce an internal balancing of apparently
important concepts with one another and with the latest fi ndings from the natural and social
sciences.
There are of course different ways of trying to integrate our traditional concepts with
one another and with our evolving scientifi c knowledge, but that is just to say that being
a conceptual conservative can be a matter of degree. A mad-dog, foaming-at-the-mouth
conservative is perhaps best described as a conceptual imperialist, as committed to the
view that some concepts have a kind of primacy, a kind of dominion, over all other con-
cepts and all methods of inquiry, and that, in consequence, such concepts must be retained
at any cost. A less rabid conservative is committed only to preserving certain concepts as
far as possible consistent with scientifi c fi ndings.
For present purposes these differences do not matter. My focus is on the core commit-
ment of all conservatives, not the differences in degree among them. I focus on the deeply
rooted assumption that the aim of philosophical refl ection is the integration of traditional,
humanistic concepts with the concepts and claims of our best sciences, for that assumption,
it seems to me, confl icts with the pursuit of progress in knowledge. If I am right about
this, then the answer to my second question is not fl attering. The question is, under what
conditions does progress in contemporary philosophical refl ection contribute to progress
in human knowledge? The answer is that apart from the dumb luck that serendipitous
conditions sometimes produce, contemporary philosophical refl ection, insofar as it honors
the core commitment of all conservatives, has little to add to the pursuit of human knowl-
edge. That, at any rate, is what I want to argue.
8.2 Elements of Reform
When viewed from a distance, the preservation of traditional concepts may appear a
fi ne undertaking. It may appear noble to try to marry our humanistic concepts with our
scientifi c knowledge. How else might we achieve an integrated or unifi ed view of our-
selves and the world? The quest for integration and unifi cation is a grand ambition that
hearkens back to the large-canvass works of the great theologians including, for example,
Reinhold Niebuhr’s The Nature and Destiny of Man. But there is one rather vexing
problem. As human knowledge progresses, it is increasingly clear that the humanistic
concepts bequeathed to us by our intellectual forebears cannot be sustained. They cannot
play the role they used to play in the framing of our intellectual tasks. This is because the
contest between our humanistic and scientifi c worldviews is no longer a struggle between
equally powerful antagonists. The balance has tipped away from the authority of our
humanistic concepts. And the cause of this change is clear: the growth of scientifi c
knowledge.