Conceptual Conservatism 141
that we set ourselves the task of trying to preserve these concepts. Adopting the task of
trying to preserve these concepts is tantamount to turning our back on the growth of
knowledge. It is to refuse to put behind us what we know is dubious by descent and by
psychological role.^16
The fi rst answer to my question “What are we up to when we try to preserve our concept
of normative functions?” is given by the theory of “proper” functions. The answer is
audaciously simple. The answer is that we are quite right to try to preserve our concept
of “normative functions,” on the grounds that the parts of plants and animals are literally
purposive. There really is something that hearts, hands, and eyes are “supposed to” do,
thanks to the mindless designing capacities of natural selection. On this view, the designing
powers of natural selection have conferred literal functional norms, literal standards of
performance against which actual performances are “properly” evaluated. We are properly
moved to theorize about natural purposes because living things are properly purposive.
As I argue in Norms of Nature (2001), however, the theory of proper functions faces
several problems. One is that it is redundant on the theory of systemic functions. Another
is that it fails to specify the mechanisms or processes within natural selection capable of
producing such standards of performance. This is to say that the theory fl outs the lessons
concerning analyzing inward and synthesizing laterally that motivate the expectation in
(E).^17 Here, however, the point against proper functions is more general. The theory fails
because it fl outs the directives in (D) and (P). We know that the concept “purpose” is
dubious by descent; indeed, as I have pointed out, most of Ruse’s (2003) discussion testi-
fi es to its deeply dubious nature.^18 We also have excellent theoretical and experimental
grounds for the claim that we are constitutionally confl icted regarding these concepts and,
in particular, that we are prone to apply them even when no purposes exist. It thus is naïve
to take at face value conceptual intuitions that tempt us to view the living realm as rife
with normative functions. The intuition that, for example, an incapacitated heart is “sup-
posed to” circulate blood even when it cannot is hardly an argument for thinking we ought
to preserve this intuition in our philosophical theories. To the contrary, given what we
know of our largely theological history, and given what we are learning about the retarding
effects of certain parts of our psychology, such intuitions must be treated with caution. It
is even reasonable to suspect that the stronger the intuitions we feel concerning the pur-
posiveness of living things, the more likely we are being led astray.
8.4 Conclusion
There is nothing parochial about the concepts “design” and “function” that makes them
dubious, in which case I conclude more generally that any concept dubious by descent or
by psychological role ought to be divested of its former authority in the way we formulate
our intellectual tasks. We philosophers ought to give up the orientation of the conceptual