Conceptual Conservatism 143
- Kant’s strategy for reconciling the attribution of natural purposes with the effi cient causality posited in New-
ton’s mechanics is explicated in McLaughlin (1990). - Kant’s “as if ” approach to natural purposes has been resuscitated by Ruse (2003) and critically assessed in
chapter 4 of Davies (2009). - See the marvelous discussion in Richards (2002).
- There are of course further historical roots of the concept “purpose,” including those that fi gure in the thought
of Aristotle and Plato, and it is admittedly diffi cult to know how to weight the various roots that led to our
present-day concept. I take it for granted, however, that the effects of our eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
predecessors are at least as effi cacious as our ancient predecessors. - Bechtel and Richardson (1993), which develops several interesting case studies, is exemplary.
- The discussion in Wegner (2002) illustrates what appears to be a deeply entrenched constitutional confl ict
of enormous importance for understanding human agency. - See Davies (2001), especially chapter 3.
- I develop these two parameters more fully in Davies (2009).
- See, in particular, chapters 3 and 5 of Davies (2001).
- And on some theories—the theory of cultural evolution defended in Richerson and Boyd (2005), for
example—the perpetuation of conceptual categories across generations is, in part, a causal consequence of our
psychology. The directives in (D) and (P), that is, need to be applied in tandem. Richerson and Boyd focus on
our unique capacities for imitation, but the considerations discussed by Leslie, Kelemen, and Wegner are also
relevant.
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