144 Paul Sheldon Davies
Davies, P. S. (2009). Subjects of the World: Darwin’s Rhetoric and the Study of Agency in Nature. Chicago, Ill:
University of Chicago Press.
Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Enç, B. (1979). Function attributions and functional explanations. Philosophy of Science, 46: 343–365.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (1994). A modern history theory of functions. Noûs, 28: 344–362.
Griffi ths, P. (1993). Functional analysis and proper functions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 44:
409–422.
Jablonka, E., and Lamb, M. (2005). Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic, Epigenetic, Behavioral, and Sym-
bolic Variation in the History of Life. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Kant, I. (1790). Critique of Judgment. (Bernard, J. H., trans.) Hafner Press, 1951.
Keil, F. C. (1994). The birth and nurturance of concepts by domains: The origins of concepts of living things.
In: Mapping the Mind: Domain Specifi city in Cognition and Culture (Hirschfeld, L., and Gelman, S., eds.),
234–254. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Kelemen, D. (2004). Are children “intuitive theists?”: Reasoning about purpose and design in nature. Psychologi-
cal Science, 15: 295–301.
Kitcher, P. (1993). Function and design. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 18: 379–397.
Leslie, A. (2000). “Theory of mind” as a mechanism of selective attention. In: The New Cognitive Neurosciences,
2nd edition (Gazzaniga, M., ed.), 1235–1247. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Leslie, A., and Thaiss, L. (1992). Domain specifi city in conceptual development: Neuropsychological evidence
from autism. Cognition, 43: 225–251.
Look, B. (2006). Blumenbach and Kant on mechanism and teleology in nature: The case of the formative drive.
In: The Problem of Animal Generation in Early Modern Philosophy (Smith, J. E. H., ed.), 355–372. New York,
N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.
Lycan, W. (1988). Judgment and Justifi cation. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.
MacDonald, G., and Papineau, D. (eds.). (2006). Teleosemantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Matthen, M. (1988). Biological functions and perceptual content. The Journal of Philosophy, 85: 5–27.
McGinn, C. (1989). Mental Content. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.
McLaughlin, P. (1990). Kant’s Critique of Teleology in Biological Explanation. Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter:
The Edwin Mellen Press.
Millikan, R. (1984). Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT
Press.
Millikan, R. (1989). In defense of proper functions. Philosophy of Science, 56: 288–302.
Neander, K. (1991). Functions as selected effects: The conceptual analyst’s defense. Philosophy of Science, 58:
168–184.
Niebuhr, R. (1941). The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation (Volume I: Human Nature). New
York, N.Y.: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Oyama, S., Griffi ths, P., and Gray, R. (eds.). (2001). Cycles of Contingency: Developmental Systems and Evolu-
tion. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Paley, W. (1802). Natural Theology: Or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity Collected From
the Appearances of Nature. London: reprinted Farnborough, G., 1970.
Papineau, D. (1993). Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers.
Plantinga, A. (1993). Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Post, J. (1991). Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. New York: Paragon House.
Post, J. (2006). Naturalism, reduction, and normativity: Pressing from below. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 73: 1–27.
Preston, B. (1998). Why is a wing like a spoon? A pluralist theory of functions. The Journal of Philosophy, 95:
215–254.