154 Andrew Light
view we can safely describe restorations as an attempt to do something but remain safely
agnostic on whether the thing they do is necessarily good or bad in relation to nature or
ourselves. Still, by adopting the ICE account, we can begin to see another valuable aspect
of restorations, namely how they can serve as large-scale ecological experiments that help
us to understand how ecological systems do function, how they deliver critical services
for ourselves and other species, and how different forms of disturbance can interfere with
these functions. Again this is not to attribute a necessary plan to nature (or reduce the
natural world to a plan) in the same way that we would understand the blueprint for a
building but only to see that this form of environmental intervention by us is feasible as
a product of our understanding of how nature “works” in some respects.
9.2 Relationships with Objects
If we assume that ecological restorations are artifacts that can be described in terms of
their functional properties then can we circumvent the unsavory implications that Katz or
Elliot would attribute to any artifact that would replace a natural object? I believe we can.
What must be demonstrated is that artifacts, like natural objects, may possess obligation-
generating normative properties. They may not be the same properties (though in section
9.3 I argue that, at least on my view, they are very similar) but the plausible case that there
are such properties helps to show that there is still more work to be done once we have
settled the descriptive question of whether restorations are “natural” or not.
One route to this kind of argument is to fi rst recognize the implicit assumption on Katz
and Elliot’s views that our moral relationships (and explicit or implicit obligations) with
artifacts cannot be as strong as the relationships we could have with natural systems on
the assumption that natural systems have a direct moral value that should be respected.
One thing that may be overlooked on such a view is that artifacts can bear meaning in a
normative sense in a way that does not degenerate into some kind of occult view. At the
very least objects can be the unique bearers of meaning for relationships among humans
that hold strong normative content and in that sense we can interact with them in ways
that can be described as better or worse in a moral sense.
There are lots of examples of how we can relate to one another in better or worse ways
through objects. Some may fi nd trite the examples that come to mind—the political
meaning of fl ags for instance (I was terrifi ed as a young Cub Scout to let the American
fl ag touch the ground simply because I was told that it was wrong). But it would seem
hard to deny that objects can stand for the importance of relationships between humans
such as is the case with wedding bands. There may even be some argument to be made
that we should respect some objects in their own right. To be more precise I would maintain
that we can be lacking in a kind of virtue when we do not respect objects in some cases,
especially, when such objects stand for the importance of relationships we have with