Ecological Restoration 157
past relationship out of some justifi ed anger over the relationship. But where no such
reason exists, and the object stands for a relationship still cherished, such an action would
be questionable. Someone hearing me brag about smashing this watch for no reason might
justifi ably hesitate in forming a relationship with me. Does this example imply that the
meaning or signifi cance of the relationship that the watch represents is lost if I smash it?
Certainly not, as any object is not the primary bearer of the meaning of any relationship.
Does this mean that all objects bear meaning in this way? Again no. Just as the value of
some relationships with others can be reduced merely to instrumental terms so too the
value of some objects can be reduced merely to their use or exchange value.
Now imagine that I show you a second watch that I own—a plain cheap plastic digital
watch. This is the watch that I use when I go running in the afternoons so I can see how
long it takes me and I can fi nd out if my time improves as I continue to run. I actually
don’t remember where I got this watch. If I smash this watch very little is implied about
my character as this watch does not bear any meaning that has normative content that can
refl ect on my relations to others.
Finally on this point, if there is something to these intuitions, then the meaning of objects
in this normative sense can fade over time. But, importantly, this is not a unique property
of objects since the meaning of our relationships with other persons can also fade over
time. Still, recognizing that the normative content of objects can fade deserves some atten-
tion. If I fi nd an object in an antique store, say a watch made in 1850 with an inscription
from a wife to a husband in it, would it be worse of me to smash it than it was to smash
the plastic runner’s watch? If I fi nd reason to assume that this watch stood for someone
else’s normative relationship, even though that person is not me nor anyone that I know,
is there something better or worse about my character depending on how I treat that object?
I probably do not want to think about the meaning of my treatment of the antique store
watch in the same way that I would the treatment of an object that has meaning in a rela-
tionship I am in now but I think there is something there that should give us pause. What-
ever the meaning of the 1850 watch is we can imagine our assessed value of it as providing
something akin to the reasons we might have to avoid smashing up old buildings or other
historical artifacts. Still, it also might be that we have independent reasons to try to respect
such objects as well, similar to the arguments I have offered so far in this section. Such
issues deserve more treatment than I have space to address here though I do not believe
that refl ection on those issues would change the conclusions I come to in section 9.3.
Where does this discussion get us with respect to our topic at hand, ecological restora-
tions? At least it gives us reasons we can build on to fi nd value in restorations even if, as
Elliot and Katz have it, they are only artifacts. On this account, however, their value as
artifacts also depends on how they help to mediate the sort of human relationships that
are presumptive reasons for action.