IV FUNCTIONS AND CLASSIFICATION

Functions play an important part in the way we carve up our world, especially that part
of the world that is populated by technical artifacts. Usually these technical artifacts are
classifi ed on the basis of their functions, that is, their proper functions. If someone uses a
coin to fasten a screw, that coin does not become a member of the class of screwdrivers.
Technical artifacts are not classifi ed on the basis of their accidental functions but on the
basis of their proper functions. That immediately raises the question of how to distinguish
between proper and accidental functions, a topic that is addressed extensively in part II.
Another issue is whether the classifi cation of technical artifacts in functional classes cor-
responds to the existence of real functional kinds in the world or whether such a functional
classifi cation is just a practical method of fi nding our way in this world. This concerns the
ontology of the artifactual world. This is a topic that raises, for instance, the question of
how the ontology of the artifactual world is related to the ontology of the natural world.
The artifactual world, as compared with the natural world, has a ring of being “artifi cial,”
that is, of “lacking in natural quality” or even of “being feigned or faked.” Indeed the
artifactual world is often taken to be ontologically inferior to the natural world. For
instance, the desk on which this introduction is written may be claimed not to exist in the
same sense that the atoms and molecules of which it is made exist. If the artifact kind
“desk” is taken to exist in the world at all, its ontological status is usually taken to be
subordinated to or dependent upon the ontological status of natural kinds (for a criticism
of this position see, e.g., Thomasson 2007). Such an ontological position presupposes that
it is possible to make a clear distinction between natural and artifi cial entities. However,
conceptually as well as ontologically the classifi cation of objects as natural and artifi cial
is problematic. So the natural-artifi cial distinction as well as the classifi cation of artifi cial
objects themselves into subclasses raises conceptual and ontological questions in which
the notion of “function” often plays a central role. This part is devoted to an analysis of
some problems related to the role of functions in classifying entities in our world, espe-
cially in the artifi cial world.
Romano discusses the user’s capacity to conceptualize the function that a designer
intended for an artifact and the role that that function plays in distinguishing between