Being For 169
the conditions that an entity must fulfi ll in order to be mind-dependent. However, in order
to gain a richer understanding of the relation of mind-dependency, a complementary
analysis is required. The analysis most worth pursuing is a cognitive investigation of how
we perceive and conceive artifacts and their difference from natural entities. This may
enhance the explanatory power of previous ontological investigations into these fi elds.
10.1.2
I scrutinize the question of how we perceptually and conceptually approach artifacts and
natural entities by referring to studies of the cognitive abilities of human beings. Most
cognitive psychologists consider the identifi cation of artifacts to be based on the capa-
city to recognize their mind-dependency; the same holds for ontologists. Psychologists
have worked to attain a suitable and detailed explanation of the relational property of
mind-dependency that we recognize in artifacts. According to them, we ascribe mind-
dependency to artifacts by means of certain mental mechanisms. These mechanisms are
usually considered to implement second-order intentional attitudes, that is, intentional
attitudes about intentional attitudes. According to this idea, in order to identify an artifact
a cognitive subject has to detect the intentional relation occurring between an author and
his or her creation. This is also taken to determine the function of the artifact at stake. The
capacity to recognize artifacts therefore is taken to be metaintentional because it is an
intentional pattern (the one of the interpreter) about another intentional pattern (the one
engaged by an author with the artifact that he or she has created). There are two different
psychological accounts of this.
Some theorists (e.g., German and Defeyter 2000; German and Johnson 2002; Kelemen
and Carey 2007) have labeled the metaintentional capacity at stake “Design Stance,”
inspired by the work of the American philosopher Daniel Dennett, who termed “Stance
of Design”^3 a particular predictive strategy. To avoid misunderstandings, a sketchy char-
acterization of Dennett’s Design Stance is needed; this characterization in fact has a
meaning that is different from the one adopted by cognitive psychologists.
Dennett (Dennett 1983, 1996) has formulated his philosophical framework on the basis
of a methodological strategy that can be defi ned as the theory of stances. According to
Dennett, we can predict what a certain item will be and do by taking either the Physical
Stance, the Intentional Stance, or the Design Stance. The Physical Stance predicts how a
certain object works in accordance with physical and mechanical laws. The Intentional
Stance predicts the behavior of that object in terms of its rationality. The Design Stance
predicts the workings or the role of the entity at stake inasmuch as it has been designed
in a certain way.^4
The approach taken by Dennett with the theory of the stances is methodological, and
does not need (or seek) any direct specifi c correspondence with actual structures of the
human mind. The theory of the stances is based on the interpretation of certain patterns