178 Giacomo Romano
that we could perceive a functional sequence by means of a functional scheme that prob-
ably belongs to our perceptual and conceptual apparatus and that makes us conceive of
the elements of the for-ness sequence as being unifi ed in an individual procedural
path.^15
The ability to jointly perceive an antecedent state of affairs, a transformation process,
and a consequent state of affairs in the for-ness sequence makes possible or enhances the
phenomenal understanding, so to speak, of certain operational performances. In fact detect-
ing for-ness provides an understanding of certain paths for the realizability of some phe-
nomena, those phenomena that are engendered by a transformation processes. This ability
amounts to what can be defi ned as functional knowledge and I take it to be implemented
with a Functional Stance, the stance realized by the application of the functional scheme.
The knowledge acquired by means of simple causal cognition does not facilitate the
understanding of the procedural path that is provided by functional knowledge.
That which I have defi ned as functional knowledge is what enables humans to detect
that certain entities are for something without appealing to the agency of the author who
is supposed to have designed those entities. Therefore there is no need to involve metain-
tentional abilities as did German and Defeyter as well as Kelemen and Carey (though less
convincingly). According to these authors, such cognitive performance would make use
of the capacity to detect someone’s intentional attitudes about a certain entity, the entity
that is intended for something. I argue instead that in order to grasp that an object is for
something, no special metaintentional operation is required that assumes that someone, an
agent, has intentionally made or conceived that object for something.
According to my hypothesis, we recognize for-ness in objects just because we apply
our functional scheme to them. This makes them appear as catalysts of the transformation
process in the for-ness relational sequence. No other cognitive device or presupposition
is required to realize that some entities are for something. In my hypothesis, therefore,
for-ness is a fairly simple, perhaps primitive, elementary feature that is revealed with the
application of the functional scheme. This scheme is a tool of the human cognitive appa-
ratus; it does not need a particular load of cognitive resources required in a metaintentional
capacity, nor does it require special cognitive training. I take it to be effective already by
the age of four or possibly younger—as soon as a child recognizes that an object is for
something. One might take the functional stance by default, automatically or without
active consideration, due to the lack of viable cognitive alternatives, such as the recogni-
tion of causation in case this was not cogent. The application of the functional scheme by
default would thus explain why we can indistinctly recognize any kind of object, either
natural or artifactual, as being for something; even though some of these objects are or
might be for nothing. This functional scheme leads to a transformational procedure that
very likely consists of a number of other processes. These are too many and too complex
to be grasped by the human mind and may be in principle cognitively inaccessible; they
merge into our broader phenomenal understanding of the world. For this reason we need