Being For 183
“affordance” employed by Gibson. According to Gibson, an “affordance” is an interaction between an animal
and an environment; it is a resource that the environment offers to an animal, but the animal has to be able to
perceive and use it. Moreover, affordance also exists if not perceived. For-ness is instead, in my view, a relation
that is always dependent on the cognitive apparatus of an animal (the human being), therefore it is not present
on its own by itself, and it is a relation that is projected between things in the world, separate from their
usability.
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