Realism and Artifact Kinds 201
from those such as Dawkins (1986), who uphold the thesis that any design attribution—thus also any function
attribution—is to be justifi ed on the basis of selective processes. See also the original approach adopted by Elder
(2004).
- Here some clarifi cation is needed in order to avoid possible misinterpretation of (FK) and (FA). These schemes
are grounded in the idea that there is a one-to-one relation between functions attributed to objects according to
a certain criterion and artifact kinds. For example, something that is a bicycle has a certain function, and some-
thing that is a hammer has another function. If our theory of function attribution allows for something to have
both the function of a bicycle and the function of a hammer, then we must decide if either this object is an
instantiation of a particular exotic kind of artifact, the bicy-hammer, or if it is an instantiation of two different
kinds of artifact—that is, that it is both a bicycle and a hammer. It is necessary to pay attention here to the fact
that for an object to be considered the instantiation of an artifact kind, it is necessary that the right relation exist
between that object and the function. For example, if we adopt a criterion such that the function of an object is
the one that it has been designed for, even if it is possible for something that has the function of a bicycle to be
used as a hammer in certain peculiar circumstances, this is not suffi cient for that object to be both a bicycle and
a hammer. - The counterfactuals that need to be granted are of the following type: if a is a copy of b, with respect to a
range of inheritable determinates d 1 , d 2 ,... dn of a determinable property D—for example the properties brown,
blond, red, etc. with respect to the determinable hair color—then it is true that if b, the parents in the biological
case, had a property dn, a, the descendant in the biological case, would have a certain property dm—where dn and
dm can be different properties. The general idea is that the transmission of characters obeys some law like gen-
eralizations that support counterfactuals of this type. See Millikan (1984). - Designing does not necessarily lead to a physical entity like a drawing—a design can also be a mere mental
plan. - Here I am not trying to base a conceptual distinction on linguistic uses—”malfunctioning” can actually also
be used to refer to a chair standing on an uneven fl oor. I just want to stress that even if we label both a chair
with a broken leg and a chair standing on an uneven fl oor as “malfunctioning,” we nonetheless consider them
to be malfunctioning in a somewhat different way.
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