VEVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES

Evolution is the process by which biological function bearers come into being, through
the random variation of traits that are already present and the differential—or selective—
survival of only some of the organisms. The concept is often transferred to the cultural
history of technical artifacts, which can also be described as a process of more or less
random modifi cation and selective retention of certain modifi cations. The fi nal part of this
volume is therefore dedicated to analyses of organisms and artifacts from an evolutionary
perspective. These analyses do not discuss whether evolution is also the source of the
normativity of functions, as do the contributions to part II and the fi rst contributions to
part III. They rather consider some implications of the view that the functional organiza-
tion of an entity is a result of evolutionary processes, inquire into the transfer of evolution-
ary concepts between the domains of biology and technology, and as far as the technological
case is at stake, analyze the relation between evolution and intentionality.
Houkes assesses two different approaches of transferring evolutionary concepts to the
explanation of technical artifacts. He argues that what he calls the “confl ict image” of
selected and intended functions is an oversimplifi cation and that the boundary between
the biological and technological domains is an open border rather than an iron curtain. His
examples are evolutionary archaeology and evolutionary design in electronics. On the one
hand, he criticizes the viewing of these approaches as genuine applications of the whole
framework of evolutionary theory, while on the other hand, he takes the application of a
limited set of evolutionary concepts in these fi elds seriously and queries how they can be
combined with the intentionalist account that he sees still present and even dominant. He
shows that evolutionary notions are introduced to solve specifi c problems in establishing
artifact lineages and in design heuristics. He also demonstrates that in none of the cases
are serious attempts made to fi nd counterparts of more evolutionary notions than those
that serve this immediate purpose. Intentionality is merely supplemented by evolutionary
concepts or redescribed in terms of evolution. According to Houkes, this result shows that
scientifi c practice does not allow for a clear distinction to be drawn between evolutionary
and intentional approaches. There is a vast and variegated border area between the domains.
This result, drawn as it is from scientifi c practice, leaves open the possibility that