13

The Open Border: Two Cases of Concept Transfer from

Organisms to Artifacts

13.1 Introduction: The Confl ict Image

Conceptually, organisms and artifacts have a long-standing but troubled relationship. This
chapter is about one relatively recent aspect of this relationship, namely the transfer of
evolutionary concepts and models, developed for the domain of organisms, to the domain
of artifacts. More specifi cally I study whether this episode fi ts an image on which any
such transfer from biology to technology would create a confl ict between the conventional,
intentionalist description of artifacts and the selectionist framework of evolutionary theory.
On the basis of two case studies, I argue that there is no such confl ict: the transfer of con-
cepts and the relation between the intentionalist and selectionist frameworks are con-
siderably more peaceful and subject to more varied and complicated interests and
constraints.
Let me start by sketching what I call the “confl ict image.” On this image, artifacts cannot
be described completely without making heavy use of teleological and intentional termi-
nology: artifacts are designed to serve some particular purpose, and they are consequently
used as means to some end. By contrast, the domain of organisms is selectionist: biological
items are described as reproduced through genetic mechanisms, modifi ed by blind varia-
tion, and subject to purposeless natural selection. The exact structure and status of these
descriptions is of course quite different: the intentionalist description is a relatively loose
set of “folk” notions, whereas the selectionist description is arguably a well-developed
and robust scientifi c theory. I denote both descriptions loosely as “frameworks.” Most
relevant here is that on the confl ict image the frameworks are incompatible: intentionality
and natural selection do not mix, and notions used in one framework cannot be transposed
to the other. The frameworks are separated by an iron curtain.
The possibilities for confl ict do not end there, for one might maintain a strict separation
of domains, parallel to that between frameworks. Consequently one ought to purge biology
of all intentionalist (or even all teleological) elements, or proclaim such elements to be
either metaphorical or misguided. Or one may argue that the role of intentionality in the
construction of artifacts and sociocultural entities almost automatically frustrates the

Wybo Houkes