228 Wybo Houkes
application of evolutionary theory. An alternative to this separatist image is to seek a uni-
fi cation by applying either the intentionalist or the selectionist framework to both domains
and abolishing the other. Although this image does not involve an iron curtain between
domains, it does maintain a strict separation of frameworks: applying the selectionist
framework to artifacts would automatically mean that the intentionalist framework is
abolished. In either the separatist or the unionist scenario, peaceful coexistence is ruled
out on both sides of the border.
This confl ict image of frameworks and domains is partly made of straw.^1 Yet if one
analyzes the relation between artifacts and organisms by concentrating on a single concept,
one might easily—and perhaps unwittingly—support one of these images. Thus if one
concentrates on the notion of “selection,” “design,” or “function” alone, the results of the
analysis are likely to be that the notion, as applied to artifacts and to organisms, a) means
different things (e.g., “intentional” versus “natural” selection), so that any conceptual
transfer trades on an ambiguity, or is merely metaphorical; or b) means the same thing,
so that the domains are effectively unifi ed.^2
Part of what might make the confl ict image attractive to philosophers is that it ascribes
them a clear task: they may, or even should, monitor any conceptual traffi c between the
domains of artifacts and organisms. If one prefers separatism, there are ample opportunities
for smuggling, that is, illicit transfer of concepts and models between the domains. Indeed
if such transfer does not involve harmless souvenirs from the other domain (i.e., meta-
phors), it is very likely to amount to smuggling (i.e., making a category mistake). Alter-
natively if one endorses unionism, traffi c between the domains may ultimately amount to
a conceptual invasion in which philosophers can act as spies, pointing out sources of
resistance (i.e., key concepts still in need of reduction). In either case the iron curtain
image offers plenty of job opportunities for philosophers.
I argue, however, that the actual transfer of concepts from the domain of organisms to
that of artifacts does not fi t these projects of separation and unifi cation. On them one would
expect this transfer to involve either the promise of a unifi cation of both realms or grand
delusions and gross ambiguities—and perhaps both. In practice, however, one fi nds that
intentionality and natural selection may coexist in various ways within the domain of
technical artifacts.
Before my argument gets underway, however, let me briefl y address an objection that
it is redundant. As anyone who studies the interrelations between artifacts and organisms
knows, so this objection goes, there is a vast and variegated border area between the
domains, which might be regarded as contested terrain. This no-man’s-land is populated
by transgenic mice, nature-identical fl avors, and restored landscapes, to give a few exam-
ples. Moreover, new items are continuously added to the border area through activities
such as breeding and genetic manipulation. Given this border area of objects and activities,
refuting the confl ict image seems more like kicking a dead horse than like burning a straw
man.