II BRIDGING FUNCTIONS OF ORGANISMS AND ARTIFACTS

One of the primary topics in a comparative perspective on biological and technical func-
tions must be the question of whether there is a gap between both kinds of functions and,
if so, whether it can be bridged. The gap is visible in particular when considering the dif-
ference in the most commonly accepted bases of the normativity of function, namely the
selection history of the evolutionary adaptation of biological traits on the one hand and
the intentionality of a human designer or user on the other hand. An easy way to bridge
the gap would be by giving up the normativity of functions and thus any allusion to nor-
mativity altogether in order to understand functional talk merely in terms of a description
of systemic roles of components of a system. This may seem to be an innocent move that
allows one to understand functional talk as being purely descriptive and therefore accept-
able in any naturalistic account without need for further justifi cation. However, the poten-
tial to distinguish function from dysfunction would in this way be renounced, which would
go against the biological and the technological use of the concept of functionality.
Perlman votes to not refrain from teleology but rather to refocus the debate on teleologi-
cal functions. He fi rst recommends giving up positions in the debate that may seem natural
to many participants but that he regards as too restrictive. His recommendations are 1)
Don’t draw a hard line between natural functions and functions of artifacts, 2) Don’t let
teleofunctional theories neglect contexts, 3) Don’t make designer’s intentions essential to
artifact function, and 4) Don’t let theories of teleology spiral out of control into defi nitional
oblivion. Recommendations 2 and 3 are, in part, specifi cations of 1; they specify the basic
steps that are required to avoid the hard dividing line between natural and biological func-
tions. Recommendation 4 is designed to protect us from defi nitorial sophistry that distracts
our attention from the fundamental issue we are tackling. Perlman regards such sophistry
as inevitable in approaches to functionality that aim at a unifi catory approach. To avoid it
he proposes allowing for different facets of functionality in both fi elds, biological and
artifi cial functionality. Emphasis should be shifted to explanatory use of function ascrip-
tions of different kinds—an approach he calls “Pragmatic Teleo-Pluralism.”
Preston considers the problem of bridging organismic and artifactual functions from
another perspective. She deals with the problem of making sense of the concept of a proper