function—that is, a function that “sticks” to its bearer like a proper name to a person—in
both considered domains. Proper functions were initially defi ned by referring to the evo-
lutionary etiology of a trait in terms of a history of selection and reproduction (Wright
1973; Millikan 1984). The idea that natural selection picks out biological proper functions
in that way has been, according to Preston, progressively eroded, which now makes it
doubtful that natural selection has any such relationship to proper function. She shows
that the same doubts hold with respect to the parallel case where cultural selection is
regarded as the basis of the occurrence of proper functions of technical artifacts and of
material culture in general. She then assesses the idea of transferring more recent modifi -
cations of the etiological account of biological functions to functions of material culture.
She concludes that neither reference to only the recent selection history (instead of to the
whole evolutionary past), nor a defi nition based on the contribution made by a function
bearer to the biological fi tness of an organism can be transferred to artifactual functions.
Fitness in particular does not have a good analogue in material culture. She concludes that
defi nitions of proper function that are suitable for biology are unlikely to be of much use
as models for a defi nition of proper function in material culture. Preston proposes that
proper functions of material culture are rather based in use and reproduction.
Longy chooses a completely different approach to discuss the gap between biological
and artifactual functions. She questions whether there is a conceptually clear distinction
between both domains that needs to be bridged at all. She takes it that biological functions
currently are described as selected effects and artifactual or cultural functions as intended
effects. Pointing to functions in domesticated animals and cultivated plants that are at once
biological and artifactual, she argues that no ontological basis for the mentioned distinction
can be found. From this observation she concludes that we need to adopt a different per-
spective on functions than the selected-versus-intentional dichotomy can offer. This
dichotomy refers to the origins of functions, but precisely the origins are often of a mixed
nature, comprising both selection and intention. Consequently Longy proposes placing
less weight on these origins. An acceptable account of functionality should be more
abstract and allow for different (selective) mechanisms rather than make the concept
dependent on a particular mechanism. The approach to functionality she exposes is closely
related to Wright’s (1973) account but avoids some shortcomings that Wright’s approach
is often accused of.
Vermaas concentrates on another aspect that divides biological from artifactual func-
tions. With respect to biology he refers to the main stream of approaches clustered around
Wright’s and Millikan’s proper function accounts and takes it that biological functions are
usually considered to be features the function bearers objectively possess. In contrast,
functions of technical artifacts are viewed as subjective features of the artifacts that depend
on the beliefs of agents. He argues that though theories of biological function often fi t in
well with the objectivity presupposition and theories of artifactual function with the sub-
jectivity view, the difference between the theories is not a categorical one. First, he intro-
14 Part II