The Open Border 239
Although there ought to be no a priori regulations for this type of transfer, the open-
border image does not lead to philosophical quietism: even if one acknowledges that there
is no need for separatist border patrol or unionist espionage, philosophers may be actively
involved in open-border transfer in various ways.^21 First, I have described how consider-
ations of structural similarity between the domains motivate the transfer of concepts and
models, and I have elevated the existence of these similarities to a criterion of evaluation.
Philosophers might study these similarities, or claims about them in scientifi c research
programs, and pass judgment on which episodes of transfer are warranted by them and
which are either metaphorical or misguided. This type of evaluation is not straightforward;
it calls for a detailed and well-informed analysis of rapidly evolving fi elds. The same goes
for the second type of task, which is to study whether the intentionalist and selectionist
frameworks are, in the end, incompatible in the domain of artifacts. Despite the argument
given in this section, this incompatibility aspect of the confl ict image may still be defen-
sible. Although both the fi elds of EA and ED involve the transfer of concepts and models
from the domain of organisms to that of artifacts, neither seems to involve transfer between
frameworks. In a sense, intentions and natural selection are kept apart in both fi elds, albeit
within the domain of artifacts. Thus one might still argue that the frameworks are incom-
patible and that coexistence can or should not lead to any real conceptual interchange.
Evaluating this multicultural image would require a detailed study of the frameworks used
in EA and ED, and it would require philosophers to consider multiple concepts, chart their
relations, and keep track of changes within this conceptual framework used in a domain
or fi eld. Most challenging, it requires the development of tools for analyzing the relations
between intentionalist and selectionist concepts in the domain of artifacts. The situation
at the open border between organisms and artifacts leaves philosophers little choice but
to face these two tasks.
Notes
- The iron curtain image may shape debates on the relation between artifacts and organisms, and the selectionist
and teleological frameworks—such as the Intelligent Design controversy, (anti)adaptationism in biology, and the
ongoing search for a memetic mechanism for cultural evolution. In all these cases there is a tendency either to
a) keep the two frameworks carefully apart and to rule out conceptual incursions, or b) extend one framework
to another domain in its entirety. - One way to avoid the iron curtain image in “single-conceptual-analysis” projects is to develop a single non-
intentionalist and nonselectionist concept and apply it to both domains. Ulrich Krohs’s (2004) theory of functions
may provide the only example of this type of analysis. - For example, International Conference on Evolvable Systems (ICES; roughly biennial since 1996; proceed-
ings published in Springer’s Lecture Notes on Computer Science series), NASA/DoD conference on Evolvable
Hardware (EH; annual since 1999), and Genetic and Evolutionary Computing Conference (GECCO; biennial
1989–2000, annual since 2000; selected papers published in Natural Computing and Genetic Programming and
Evolvable Machines). - The interested reader may consult the introductory chapters of Thompson (1998) or Layzell (2001) for a
schematic impression of the actual methods involved in ED.