duces suffi cient conditions to transpose function-ascription theories into theories about
functions-as-properties. He then shows how theories that analyze functions of technical
artifacts in terms of beliefs of agents can be transposed into theories in which artifacts
have functions as properties. He shows how this transformation allows a theory of (subjec-
tive) artifact functions to also be applied to the realm of (objective) biological functions.
The resulting unifi ed theory of function is an epistemic one, so the objectivity of ascribed
functions is given only within the epistemic framework of the ascribing theory. This will
still not satisfy those who are looking for an objective account of biological functions that
fi ts within a unifi ed approach. But the demonstration of how theories of objective and
subjective function may be unifi ed sheds new light on the question of the gap between
biological and artifactual functions.
References
Millikan, R. G. (1984). Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism.
Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Wright, L. (1973). Functions. The Philosophical Review, 82: 139–168.
Bridging Functions of Organisms and Artifacts 15