Technical Artifacts, Engineering Practice, and Emergence 287
It is one thing to explain a physical feature; it is another to explain how this feature
corresponds to a particular function. For someone with only physical knowledge about
the world, the function of the clock cannot be explained on the basis of that person’s
knowledge base. So we may conclude that relative to a knowledge base that consists
of only physical knowledge, the function is an emergent property of the physical
object.
Suppose we enlarge the physical knowledge base with technical knowledge and all there
is to know about the intentions and actions of designers, producers, users, and so forth
with regard to the object; then the situation becomes different. This expanded knowledge
base does seem to be suffi cient for predicting and explaining that the function of the object
is to measure time. The knowledge about how an object is embedded within the practices
of intentional human action is precisely the kind of knowledge that archaeologists try to
reconstruct to determine what the function of an object might be. With respect to this
knowledge base, therefore, the function of the clock is no longer an epistemically emergent
property. Note that this conclusion is based on a very strong assumption about the knowl-
edge base, namely that it includes knowledge about how the object is going to be embed-
ded in practices of intentional human action. It is, however, not always easy (or possible)
to predict user behavior. Occasionally users attribute functions to technical artifacts that
were never intended by their designers and that were also not predictable in terms of their
knowledge base. These functions are therefore epistemically emergent from the designer’s
knowledge base (assuming that they are also not explainable on their limited knowledge
base).
From an engineering point of view, the occurrence of emergent functional features in
user contexts is a familiar issue. However, it is not this kind of emergence that has caused
such a stir recently in engineering circles. Current interest focuses on the ways complex
systems display emergent behavior (upon which functions may be based). If such complex
technical systems show systemic physical capacities that are epistemically emergent,
whether in the strong sense or in one of the weak senses, then the design and control of
these unpredictable and unexplainable physical capacities would seem to be problematic
and thus put the control paradigm in jeopardy. The fear that the control paradigm is in
danger is furthermore fueled by the association of emergence with unexpectedness and
surprise in discussions on emergence (Potgieter 2004: ch. 2; Deguet, Demazeau, and
Magnin 2006; Johnson n.d.).
It is not evident, however, that the occurrence of epistemically emergent physical fea-
tures in (complex) systems means a break with traditional engineering and therefore poses
a real threat for its control paradigm. Let us for the moment discard the possibility of the
strong form of epistemic emergence and restrict ourselves to its weak forms. First, note
that in the history of technology, countless technical artifacts have been designed and
constructed on the basis of physical phenomena that could not be theoretically predicted
or explained at the time. Relative to that contemporary knowledge base, these physical