Changing the Mission of Theories of Teleology 33
and disposition will tell us more and explain more. Let’s give ourselves an arsenal of all
of these useful concepts, and not insist that one of them is the ultimate and exclusive
account of function. The efforts to battle it out over which notion of “function” is the right
one has led many people to lose sight of the goal of the whole endeavor—to explain things.
Let us use whatever works, whatever conception of “function” is most useful, in explaining
whatever puzzles us today.
Acknowledgments
I wish to thank all the participants of the September 21–24, 2006, Workshop on Compara-
tive Philosophy of Technical Artifacts and Biological Organisms, held in Altenberg,
Austria, and especially thank its organizers Ulrich Krohs and Peter Kroes, as well as
everyone at the Konrad Lorenz Institute for sponsoring the workshop. Thanks to Wikipe-
dia.com, my source for all the photographs (which were public domain).
The Table of Theories of Functions in this chapter is from my earlier paper in The
Monist, January 2004, vol. 87, no. 1, titled “The Modern Philosophical Resurrection of
Teleology,” and is copyright © 2004, The Monist: An International Journal of General
Philosophical Inquiry, Peru, Illinois, 61354, USA. Reprinted by permission.
Notes
- See http://www.niagaraparks.com/nfgg/geology.php and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niagra_Falls.
- In her chapter in this volume, Françoise Longy also argues that the biological often mixes with the artifactual.
Where she and I differ is that she holds out hope for a unifi ed concept of “function,” whereas I go for the pluralist
position. - The chapters in this volume by Beth Preston and Françoise Longy make arguments along similar lines.
- Some claim that Bertrand Russell proposed the same problem early in the twentieth century. I do not wade
into that dispute—what matters here is that it was Gettier’s paper that led to the debate in question. - In one Gettier example, suppose I believe that Jones owns a Ford automobile, because I have seen Jones
and his Ford (i.e., a good reason). We can pick any random statement for which there is no good reason—
“Smith is in Barcelona”—and link it with “Jones owns a Ford” in a disjunction. I can believe that “Jones
owns a Ford or Smith is in Barcelona” and be justifi ed. But suppose unbeknownst to me, Jones has sold
his Ford, but also Smith just happens to actually be in Barcelona. The disjunctive belief is still true, and
justifi ed. But it does not seem like knowledge, because the disjunctive belief is true because of Smith’s location
(unjustifi ed) but justifi ed because of Jones’s car (no longer true). Thus a justifi ed true belief may not be
knowledge. - When I was a student of his at the Ohio State University, Marshall Swain conceded to me in conversation
(around 1988) that even he thought this kind of formulation had probably gone too far and was too complicated,
elaborate, and cumbersome. - Foundationalism defended by, among others, Robert Audi (1988), John Pollock (1986), and William Alston
(1989). Coherentism lead by Laurence BonJour (1985) and Keith Lehrer (1974, 1990, 1997). Externalism (relia-
bilism) developed by David Armstrong (1973) and Alvin Goldman (1976, 1986). - Contra Neander’s (1991b) defense of conceptual analysis of teleofunction. Peter Schwartz (2004) makes a
similar point against conceptual analysis.