34 Mark Perlman
- In a different fi eld, that of mental content, I see the same kind of problem. Fodor’s (1987) notion of “asym-
metric dependence” as a theory of content may well get all the cases right, and skirt the counterexamples, but
it just seems too convoluted to be a basic rule of nature, that is, too arcane and messy to be what content or
meaning is. - See also Fodor (1990), Neander (1995, 1996), and Enç (2002).
References
Allen, C., and Bekoff, M. (1995). Function, natural design, and animal behavior: Philosophical and ethological
considerations. Perspectives in Ethology, 11: 1–47.
Alston, W. (1989). Epistemic Justifi cation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Ariew, A. (2002). Platonic and Aristotelian roots. In: Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology
and Biology (Ariew, A., Cummins, R., Perlman, M., eds.), 7–32. Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press.
Armstrong, D. (1973). Belief, Truth, and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Audi, R. (1988). Belief, Justifi cation, and Knowledge. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Beckner, M. (1959). The Biological Way of Thought. New York: Columbia University Press.
Bedau, M. A. (1990). Against mentalism in teleology. American Philosophical Quarterly, 27: 61–70.
Bedau, M. A. (1991). Can biological teleology be naturalized? The Journal of Philosophy, 88: 647–655.
Bedau, M. A. (1992a). Goal-directed systems and the good. The Monist, 75: 34–49.
Bedau, M. A. (1992b). Where’s the good in teleology? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52:
781–806.
Bedau, M. A. (1993). Naturalism and teleology. In: Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal (Wagner, S., and Warner,
R., eds.), 23–51. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
Bigelow, J., and Pargetter, R. (1987). Functions. The Journal of Philosophy, 84: 181–196.
BonJour, L. (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Boorse, C. (1976). Wright on functions. Philosophical Review, 85: 70–86.
Boorse, C. (1977). Health as a theoretical concept. Philosophy of Science, 44: 542–573.
Boorse, C. (2002). A rebuttal on functions. In: Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and
Biology (Ariew, A., Cummins, R., Perlman, M., eds.), 63–112. Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press.
Buller, D. (1998). Etiological theories of function: A geographical survey. Biology and Philosophy, 13:
505–527.
Cameron, R. (2003). How to be a realist about sui generis teleology—yet feel at home in the 21st century. The
Monist, 87: 72–95.
Canfi eld, J. (1966). Introduction. In: Purpose in Nature (Canfi eld, J., ed.), 1–7. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall.
Cummins, R. (1975). Functional analysis. The Journal of Philosophy, 72: 741–765.
Cummins, R. (2002). Neo-teleology. In: Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and
Biology (Ariew, A., Cummins, R., Perlman, M., eds.), 157–172. Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press.
Dipert, R. R. (1993). Artifacts, Art Works, and Agency. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Dretske, F. I. (1986). Misrepresentation. In: Belief: Form, Content and Function (Bogdan, R. J., ed.), 17–36.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Enç, B. (2002). Indeterminacy of function attributions. In: Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychol-
ogy and Biology (Ariew, A., Cummins, R., Perlman, M., eds.), 291–313. Oxford and New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.